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EMANATION AND CREATION

The Doctrines of Plotinus and Augustine on the Radical Origin of the Universe.

THE question with which this paper deals is important for the study of the Plotinian influence upon Saint A ıgustine, and also for its bearing on the historical opposition between the Hellenic and Christian world-views. It has been treated by various historians of philosophy,[1] either in connection with the discussion of the relations between Plotinus and Augustine, or within the general exposition of the thought of the great African. In this article, in the case both of Plotinus and of Augustine, I have tried to seek the rationale of each one's thought on the origin of the universe, the vision of reality that inspired and dominated Plotinus, and the radically different vision of Augustine. My study is divided into three sections: the first on Plotinus, the second on Augustine, and a brief conclusion.

[1] Cf. e. g.: L. Grandgeorge, *Saint Augustin et le néoplatonisme*, Paris, 1896, pp. 101-112; C. Boyer, *L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1920, pp. 110 ff.; E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1931, pp. 242-252; J. Guitton, *Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et saint Augustin*, Paris, 1933, pp. 83-101 and 131-178; J. Barion, *Plotin und Augustinus*, Berlin, 1935, pp. 110-133; etc.

I. The Relation Between the Universe and the One According to Plotinus [2]

To avoid the danger of reading Plotinus through Christian eyes, it is necessary to keep in mind that for him, there was no question of a temporal beginning of the world; the Plotinian universe is given, eternal, necessary. One need only turn to the ninth treatise of the second Ennead, written against the Gnostics, or to the first treatise of the same Ennead, ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ, or to the treatise on Providence,[3] to see at a glance that the eternity of the universe is taken for granted; the only question is how matter can have a share in immortality, and this, Plotinus says, is the result of its union with the soul.[4] "The world," says Plotinus, "never began (the contrary is absurd, as we have already said) and this gives us confidence as to its future." [5] This world was not generated because the Intelligence reflected that this must be done; it results from a necessity inherent in the nature of the first being, the Intelligence.[6] The relation between the world and its principle is thus eternal and necessary; the theory of the procession of hypostases as a philosophical expression of reality is characterized by the *necessity* of this process. Plotinus asks his readers to contemplate a universe in which everything proceeds from the One in an ordered hierarchy; just as the relation between the Intelligence and the sensible world (through the intermediary of the Soul) is necessary, so too is the generation even of the Intelligence by the One, a necessary generation. To understand how the One can still remain simple and unchanged, Plotinus asks us to think of the sun, from which light

[2] References to the *Enneads* are to the edition of Emile Bréhier published in the Budé collection, Paris, 1924-1936, 7 vols., Greek text and French translation.

[3] *Enneads, Enn.* III, tractates 2 and 3.

[4] *Enn.* II, 1, paragraph 2, lines 17-28, and paragraph 3.

[5] *Enn.* II, 1, 4; ll. 25-26.

[6] *Enn.* III, 2, 2; ll. 8-10.

radiates without any motion in the sun itself, and to recall that all beings, inasmuch as they exist, necessarily produce a reality, which tends outward and depends on their power. This is true of all beings which have reached the state of perfection; the eternally perfect, then, must engender an eternal object; the most perfect, the Supreme, the One, must produce the Intelligence, the greatest of all that is posterior to the One.[7]

For Plotinus, the One, in its absolute simplicity, is the principle of all things. It is the reality on which all depend, which all desire, which is their source and which they need; but in itself, beyond all need and selfsufficient, it is the measure and limit of all things. From it come the Intelligence and Being, the Soul and Life, the intellectual activity which it gives to things.[8] It is not surprising to find that Plotinus asks an old and familiar question in his own way. . . . "How can any multiplicity, a dyad or a number come into existence from the One, such as he is for us How is it that the One has not remained in himself? How can we think of reducing this multiplicity to unity? Let us treat the subject, calling on God himself, not with words, but with an aspiration of the soul to pray to him."[9]

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the magnitude of this most celebrated philosophical problem of antiquity is thrown into the clearest possible light by Plotinus' insistence both on the absolute simplicity of the One, and on the absolute necessity of plurality, which must flow from unity. How could the most perfect and the first Good remain in himself? Would it be through jealousy? Would it be through lack of power, in him who is the active power of all things? How could he then be the principle? Something must come from him, for from

[7] *Enn.* V, 1, 6; ll. 27-41. On the necessity of the process of emanation cf. III, 2, 3, ll. 3-4; V, 1, 7, ll. 37-38; V, 2, 1, ll. 7-9; II, 9, 8, ll. 25-26; V, 4, 2; V, 3, 15-16; V, 8, 12, ll. 15-26; etc.

[8] *Enn.* I, 8, 2; ll. 2-7.

[9] *Enn.* V, 1, 6; ll. 4-10.

him, whatever is, necessarily derives the power to bring others to be.[10] That which is most beautiful in sensible things is the manifestation of what is better in intelligible things, of their power and goodness. All realities, intelligible and sensible, are interrelated. The intelligibles exist through themselves; sensible things receive existence eternally, participating it, and imitating the intelligible nature as closely as they can.[11] Perhaps, then, our task is not hopeless.

Plotinus found in Plato very little to help him solve the problem of the origin of multiplicity in unity; in the Timaeus, Plato's thought issues in the myth. Plotinus also uses the mythical form of exposition,[12] but for the most part he employs metaphors and similes to express his solutions. Bréhier [13] warns us that this use of imagery is not an external ornament, but an integral element of Plotinus' thought, for he aimed to express realities before which language fails us. Many of these metaphors are brilliant and justly famous; but they have contributed to the considerable variety of interpretations of Plotinus' thought, and have given rise to persistent misconceptions.[14]

Plotinus brings into sharp relief the distinction between the One and all things. The Intelligence is the life of all things and pervades all; it is the thought of all that is and must be all the things it thinks; infinite and multiple, it must have come from a prior principle, the principle of the Intelligence and of all beings.[15] This is the One, who, that he may engender all, is not all things or any one of them; who, that he may be the principle of multiplicity, is not multiple; who is anterior to all things.[16] What is he, then? He is the power of all things,

[10] *Enn.* V, 4, 1; ll. 34-39.
[11] *Enn.* IV, 8, 6; ll. 23-28.
[12] Cf. e. g., *Enn.* V, 8, 12-13.
[13] Cf. Emile Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin*, Paris, 1928, p. 20.
[14] Cf. J. Barion, *Plotin und Augustinus*, Berlin, 1935, p. 112.
[15] *Enn.* III, 8, 8-9.
[16] *Enn.* III, 8, 9; ll. 39-49.

δύναμις τῶν πάντων; he is above life and cause of life; the ἐνέργεια of life, which is all beings, flows from him.[17] This conception is explained in the famous simile of the spring.[18] Picture a spring which has no origin; it gives its water to all the streams that flow from it, but is not exhausted, remaining at the same level. The streams which have their source in it, at first mingle their waters, before each takes its own course; but already, each one knows where it will flow. It is this simile, as Bréhier remarks, which has led to the designation of Plotinus' system as an emanationism; but the last clause indicates that Plotinus had no intention of destroying the individual in the confusion of one sole being.[19] The next simile, that of the cosmic tree, seems better adapted to the expression of his thought. We are asked to think of the life of an immense tree; the life circulates throughout the entire tree, but the principle of the life remains unchanged; it is not divided throughout the tree, but resides in the roots.[20] This principle, while remaining unchanged, gives to the plant life in all its many manifestations; because it is not multiple, it is the principle of this multiplicity.

But the favorite symbol of Plotinus is that of light.[21] The First is compared to light; the being that comes after him, to the sun, and the third, to the moon which receives light from the sun. Plotinus in another passage proposes the metaphor of a central point, κέντρον, about which is a luminous circle that radiates from it; around this circle is another equally luminous, light from light; and outside these two circles is a third (the sensible world) which has not its own light and

[17] *Enn.* III, 8, 10; ll. 1-5.

[18] *Enn.* III, 8, 10; ll. 5-10.

[19] Cf. Bréhier, *op. cit.*, p. 166, note; *Enn.* IV, 3, 2-6, esp. par. 5. Here Plotinus tries to explain the individual distinction of souls and their identification with the All-Soul.

[20] *Enn.* III, 8, 10; ll. 10-14. Cf. *Enn.* III, 3, 7; ll. 8-28.

[21] Cf. Barion, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[22] *Enn.* V, 6, 4; ll. 16-18.

needs light from another—it is a sphere which receives light from the second circle (that of the soul). The great light remains unchanged, while enlightening all things.[23] Again, Plotinus compares the intelligible world which flows from the One, to light emanating from the sun. Above the Intelligible reigns the One, who does not disperse outside himself, the light which he radiates; he is a light before light, *φῶς πρὸ φωσὸς*, radiating light upon the intelligible world but remaining motionless and unchanged.[24] In these and other examples of Plotinus' use of the metaphor of light, and indeed in all his attempts to express the manner of the origin of the Many in the One, our philosopher seems to be straining the resources of language to express the thought that the multiplicity of things can exist only through procession from the One in an unbroken continuity from the first to the last, while emphasizing equally the absolute transcendence of the One, his distinction from all things. He assures us that we can reach the intuition of the One, but that we can not express or reveal it. We can only stammer that he is the Good; that all things come from him because he is the One, the First, the Principle; all things, of which he has no need, proceed from him; he is neither finite nor infinite, but his power proceeds to infinity, *τὸ δ'ἄπερον ἡ δύναμις ἔχει*. All things participate in him, but nothing possessesses him.[25] Because he generates all, he is nothing of that which he generates: *Γεννητικὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις οὖσα τῶν πάντων οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν*.[26] The problem of reconciling the transcendence and immanence of God is at issue in all these texts; if Plotinus' solution does not satisfy us, it is precisely his keen awareness of the difficulty of the problem, and his repeated insistence both on the transcendence and on the immanence of the One,[27] that account for the conflicting inter-

[23] *Enn.* IV, 3, 17; ll. 12 ff.
[24] *Enn.* V, 3, 12; ll. 40-45.
[25] *Enn.* V, 5, 10-11.
[26] *Enn.* VI, 9, 3; ll. 39-40.
[27] Cf. *Enn.* VI, 4-5 on the omnipresence of the One.

pretations of the meaning of his system.[28] Plotinus himself admits that his arguments for the omnipresence of the soul seem to force us to admit that there is only one being. But, he says, "all these arguments constrain us, but do not convince us; our soul is not convinced, when it expresses the opinion that being is everywhere identical with itself. Perhaps it would be better to admit that the total being is divided, but without being in any way lessened by this division, or better still, that it engenders while remaining in itself . . . the unity of the soul does not exclude the multiplicity of souls, any more than the unity of being excludes multiple being."[29] We must maintain at all costs that the principle of the things that are engendered

[28] R. Arnou ("Platonisme des Pères," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, XII, 2, cols. 2277 ff.) rejects the old opinion of Vacherot and Simon that Plotinus taught an emanationism in the sense of a substantial diffusion of the infinite into the finite. He quotes with approval the statement of Rodier: "Ce qui émane de l'Un n'est pas sa substance, mais seulement l'effet de sa causalité infinie" (G. Rodier, *Etudes de philosophie grecque*, Paris, 1926, p. 313). The expression of Zeller, "dynamist pantheism," again raises difficulties for Arnou and other scholars. Unquestionably, the seeds of pantheism are easily discovered in Plotinus, especially in the necessity which governs the procession of all things from the One (cf. the texts cited in notes 6 and 7, *supra*). Plotinus affirms the liberty of the individual and declares that the One is liberty itself, and completely independent (cf. the great treatise on liberty, *Enn.* VI, 8); yet, because he is perfect, he engenders necessarily. Paul Henry, at the end of a detailed study of the problem of liberty in Plotinus, states that in spite of Plotinus' affirmations of liberty, . . . "ni ses théories sur la liberté individuelle de l'homme, ni ses théories sur la liberté en Dieu ne permettent d'affirmer, avant tout autre examen, que Plotin n'est pas un panthéiste" (cf. P. Henry, S. J., "Le problème de la liberté chez Plotin," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie*, XXXIII (1931), pp. 50-79; 180-215; 318-338). In the absence of any notion of creation, it is difficult to see how such affirmations of liberty could have any metaphysical justification. Barion states that Plotinus, while he had no notion of creation, did not go to the other extreme of a gross emanationism or pantheism; however, he could not always satisfactorily maintain the distinction between the principle and the all (Cf. J. Barion, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-127).

[29] *Enn.* VI, 4, 4; ll. 4-11. Note the importance of persuasion in Plotinus; it helps us to struggle against the weight of sensible images. Cf. the remarks of Bréhier, Vol. VI, p. 174.

must be unique and simple; this principle, "since he is the true unity, the unity which is not a predicate but a subject, must show that he contains in his power the multiplicity of beings, the nature of which is the inverse of his own; because this multiplicity is not outside him, but depends on him and is born of him, is it true unity"—thus Plotinus in the explanation of omnipresence.[30]

The whole effort of Plotinus in this explanation of the procession of multiplicity from unity appears to depend on one supreme consideration: that although the One is the necessary cause of an eternally necessary world of multiplicity, although the power of the One pervades all and generates all so that the "All" must be regarded as an overflowing or radiation from the One, and although in virtue of the bilateral necessity of this relation we can justly say that the One would not be the absolute without this world, yet the One is completely independent and unchanged when he produces; he is self-sufficient, distinct from all else, perfectly simple, unique, and even free.[31]

Plotinus never conceived the possibility of a free creation (in the sense of freedom of choice; his One is free from external coercion and cause of his own acts), nor indeed of creation at all, in the strict sense of creation *ex nihilo*. To expect to discover this doctrine in a Greek philosopher, is to read history backwards; such an hypothesis never occurred to the antique pagan thinkers. But we must give Plotinus credit for having come as close, in his own way of dialectical idealism, to solving the problem of the radical origin of things as this was possible for any Greek thinker. He did this by what has become known as the method of negative theology. Beneath all the apparent inconsistencies of Plotinus (in regard to which he did not deceive himself), we find the constant affirmation that the origin or principle *is not being*; since he has no essence, no attribute

[30] *Enn.* VI, 5, 9; esp. ll. 31-36.
[31] Cf. *Enn.* VI, 9, 5; V, 3, 11; V, 1, 6. Esp. VI, 8, 21; ll. 19-33.

can be predicated of him. Is it Plotinus' intention to deny that the One exists, by denying to him even being? Is the One sheer nothing? Plotinus says that the One is not a being, *οὐδὲ ὄν*, because a being has a form, the form of being: *καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὂν οἷον μορφὴν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἔχει*,[32] and is therefore limited and determined. This is not precisely to deny the reality of the One; rather it is an affirmation that even reality cannot be predicated to the One as a subject, for being is conceived as a form or an essence. Since form comes from the One, he must be without form. Were it otherwise, it would be necessary, in order to account for this common element, to have recourse to a third term, anterior both to the principle of things and to things themselves.[33] To avoid this persistent difficulty, Plotinus takes the position that the One can have nothing in common with others, the things that come after him; the common element would otherwise be anterior to him.[34] To deny the being of a thing, is, it would seem, to deny its reality; but does that hold for Plotinus? Apart from the question of whether Plotinus was concerned with what other thinkers call real being, if it can be said, as I think it can, that he never went beyond the notion of being as essence, it will be evident that in denying being to the One, he was rigorously logical. Again, we are aware of the intimate relation, for Plotinus, of the philosophical problem of the structure of being, to the religious problem of the destiny of the soul.[35] Although the One is not a being, his lack of form is not comparable to that of matter, which the soul must correct by giving it form;[36] rather

[32] *Enn.* VI, 9, 3; ll. 38-39.

[33] Cf. E. Bréhier, "L'idée du néant et la problème de l'origine radicale dans le néoplatonisme grec," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, XXVI (1919), pp. 445-453, esp. p. 452.

[34] *Enn.* V, 5, 4; ll. 14-16.

[35] Cf. Bréhier, *loc. cit.*, p. 543; Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin*, p. 23; Jean Guitton, *Le temps et l'eternité chez Plotin et saint Augustin*, Paris, 1933, p. 85.

[36] Cf. *Enn.* VI, 4, 10.

is it a fulness above being, which can be grasped not by reason but only by an aesthetic intuition, a vision which fills the soul with satisfaction. The conversion or ascent to the One in which salvation consists, is a reversal of the procession from the One; this procession takes place through a formal inversion of essence rather than by the giving of existence.[37]

Plotinus' doctrine of the necessary and eternal origin of the multiple and changing in a procession from the absolutely simple and unchanging One was the only solution of the problem which, in his eyes, assured the *intelligibility* of the relation between this world and its principle. The necessity and consequent eternity of the world was not only in harmony with the Eudoxian theory, which is always assumed in the Plotinian system; it likewise "forms an essential or permanent trait of what we call 'Hellenism' in opposition to Christianism." To deny it is, for Plotinus, to deny the intelligibility of the world. The theory of procession, then, is his conception of the manner in which the forms in the universe are related to unity, through a hierarchical system of dependence; thus the universe can become an object of rational thought.[38]

We are confronted with a sensible, spatial world of multiplicity, change and conflict.[39] Yet, we should not despise a world which exists necessarily.[40] But in order to understand it, we must reflect that it is derived from intelligence, from an intelligible order which is absolutely unchanging. The intelligence is its principle, and archetype or model (*ἀρχέτυπον καὶ παράδειγμα*); this world is only an image. The Intelligence or being, constitutes the authentic or first world, which is inextended and undivided; it lacks nothing, even in any of its parts, since these parts are not fragments detached from the whole. It unites, in an indivisible unity, all life and all intelligence, in

[37] Cf. Guitton, *op. cit.*, p. 85, note 1.
[38] Cf. Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin*, pp. 35-36.
[39] *Enn.* III, 2, 2; ll. 2 ff.
[40] *Enn.* III, 2, 3; ll. 1-5.

such a manner that this unity makes each part a whole; each is united in itself without being separated from the others,— it is a different part, but not foreign to the others. No part harms another, even if it be its contrary. Everywhere one and complete, it is immobile and undergoes no alteration; there is no action of one part on another, since there is no imperfection. Yet, despite the immobility and self-sufficient perfection of this order, such is its perfection and blessedness that the blessed beings do great things and produce mighty works, without activity, without change; this world is the result.[41] Everything that exists in this world, is found, in a perfect and unchanging manner, in the intelligible world.[42] It would lie beyond the aim of this study to treat the intelligible world in detail; but it should be noted that the hypostasis Intelligence, this multiple unity which is the first being and the central hypostasis of the system of Plotinus, presents the three-fold aspect of a world of ideas, of the origin of forms, and of a system of monads.[43] It is a sort of concentration of the world, a multiplicity in which all is unity: *τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ὁμοῦ πλῆθος, ὁ κόσμος ὁ νοητός*;[44] it is the authentic and real cosmos the model of the fixed, stable and eternal hierarchy that rules even this world of sense and apparent disorder. The sensible things of this world have only a participated, borrowed existence; real beings exist in an independent and intellectual manner, in the Intelligence, the law of their existence, for, real being and thought are identical: *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.*[45] Real being is the multiple

[41] *Enn.* III, 2, 1; ll. 20-45.

[42] *Enn.* V, 8, 12.

[43] Cf. Bréhier, *op. cit.*, p. 95. On this important doctrine and its relations with Augustine, cf. J. Ritter, *Mundus Intelligibilis*, Frankfurt, 1937; O. Perler, *Der Nus bei Plotin und das Verbum bei Augustinus als vorbildliche Ursache der Welt*, Freiburg, 1931.

[44] *Enn.* VI, 9, 5; ll. 20-21.

[45] Cf. *Enn.* V, 9, 5, the entire paragraph. This famous formula of Parmenides is cited with approval (lines 29-30); it is also cited and explicitly attributed to Parmenides in *Enn.* V, 1, 8; ll. 14-23, where

unity of the Intelligence, as the object of its own thought; it is an object in which all essences are indivisibly contained.

There is no need at this point to repeat Plotinus' arguments for the necessity of going back to the One, as the principle of the first duality which is in the Intelligence; [46] nor do we need to be reminded that the intelligence necessarily engenders the Soul, from which the sensible world proceeds. But it is interesting and important to recall here the penetrating observation of Emile Bréhier, that strictly speaking, we cannot see a pure exemplarism in the Plotinian doctrine of the Intelligence.[47] The intelligible world is not a world of detached ideas linked together; it knows itself as an image of the One, as an object of knowledge in which there is no composition, but only indivisible unity. The truth of this knowledge is guaranteed by the fact that it is an immediate passage from thought to being since these are identical; the " essential truth is not agreement with anything else, but with itself; it says nothing but itself; it is and it expresses its being." [48] The whole universe is contained within the Intelligence, but only potentially and universally; of course this potential distinction is actualized in the Soul, from which the individual things of the sensible world proceed, but the participated or borrowed being which these things possess is an image of real being only in the sense of an imperfect copy in which the original does not appear. " The

Plotinus criticizes Parmenides. I am not concerned here with the interpretation of Parmenides himself, but only with the decisive statement of Plotinus. Again in *Enn.* V, 4, 2; ll. 45-46; Plotinus identifies thought, i. e., Intelligence, and Being: *νοῦς δὴ καὶ ὂν ταὐτόν.* Being comes to be in virtue of the Intelligence which thinks it; the object of this thought is Being, and being and thought are inseparable: *Ὁμοῦ ἄρα τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ ζῆν, τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι. Εἰ ἄρα ὄν, καὶ νοῦς, καὶ εἰ νοῦς, καὶ ὄν, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὁμοῦ μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι* (*Enn.* V, 6, 6; ll. 21-23). For the text of Parmenides, from ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ, fragment 5, cf. H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3rd ed., Berlin, 1912, Band I, p. 152.

[46] Cf. e. g., *Enn.* V, 5, 5; etc.

[47] Cf. Bréhier, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-103; *Enn.* V, 5.

[48] *Enn.* V, 5, 2; ll. 18-20.

supreme nature is everywhere present, but it does not appear everywhere, because the subject is incapable of receiving it." [49] Return to the universal being can be achieved only by throwing aside all limitations; descent from him is the result of an addition, which comes from non-being, for nothing can be added to being: it is by the addition of non-being, that one becomes an individual.[50] The thoroughly idealistic character of the system of Plotinus is nowhere clearer than in these considerations. But, we must hasten to add, the Intelligence is not a mere empty identity; it is a living dynamism and the principle of a constructive dialectic, and this is why Plotinus says so often that to think oneself is to think all things.[51] The Soul is the "word" of the Intelligence and the activity (*ἐνέργεια*) by which the Intelligence sends forth the life by which all things subsist.[52] Plotinus is thus able to reduce all the activity of being to the movement of thought, and the procession from the One even into the darkness of the sensible world, appears as a sort of "hypostasized spiritual life," in Bréhier's phrase. This life flows from the One downward, but whatever is engendered is complete and perfect only when it is turned toward its principle. Thus even in the generation of the Intelligence, we find two moments. Until it turns toward the One, it is not yet intelligence but a vision without an object; turned toward the One, it becomes vision in act, Intelligence, for it then possesses the One as Intelligence.[53]

I have tried to explain, in a general way, how Plotinus, who never wavered in the conviction that the world is necessary and eternal, sought to solve the problem of the origin of multiplicity in unity, a problem which necessarily arises when such a view of the world is taken. His search for intelligibility led

[49] *Enn.* VI, 5, 11; ll. 30-31.
[50] *Enn.* VI, 5, 12; ll. 16-23.
[51] Cf. Bréhier, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-106; *Enn.* IV, 4, 2; ll. 10-14; etc.
[52] *Enn.* V, 1, 3; ll. 7-9.
[53] *Enn.* V, 3, 11; ll. 4-12. Cf. Enn. V, 6, 5.

him to the identification of being with mind; the origin of being in the One, and the manner in which being is shared by all things, could then be analyzed in the dialectical system of procession through hypostases. The result is a universe of forms, hierarchically ordered in a continuity which is imposed by mind. In the second tractate of the fifth Ennead, after a brief description of the procession from the One, through the Intelligence and the Soul, to the universe of sensible things, he emphasizes the continuity of the whole. Nothing is cut off from that which precedes it.[54] In the procession from the first to the last, each thing remains in its proper place, the thing engendered on a plane inferior to that of its generator.[55] Thus all things are the First and are not the First; they are the First because they are derived from him; they are not the First because he, while remaining within himself, is their source. All things are like a Life which extends in a straight line; each of the successive points of the line is distinct, but the whole line is continuous.[56]

II. Augustinian Creation

St. Augustine's earliest extant writings date from the year 386; except for the *Contra Academicos*, the *De Beata Vita*, the *De Ordine*, the *Soliloquia*, the *De Immortalite Animae* and part of the *De Musica*, all his major works were written after his baptism.[57] We should expect, then, to find in Augustine's teaching on the radical origin of the universe, consistent evidence of the influence of Revelation. But the God of the Hebrews and the Christians is free and almighty. The world, on the other hand, is totally dependent on Him and even had a temporal beginning: "In the beginning, God created heaven

[54] *Enn.* V, 2, 1; ll. 21-22.
[55] *Enn.* V, 2, 2; ll. 1-3.
[56] *Ibid.*, ll. 25-30.
[57] Cf. E. Portalié, "Augustin," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, Vol. 1, 2, cols. 2311-2314, for a most convenient chronological list of Augustine's works.

and earth." [58] An irreconcilable disparity separates the Greek view of a necessary and eternal universe, from the Judaeo-Christian conception of the unilateral dependence of a world which began to be, on God Who always is.[59] Since this doctrine marks more clearly than any other, the opposition between the faith to which he gave his allegiance, and all forms of Hellenism, one may well ask what expression the great African Doctor gave to it.

It has often been remarked that Augustine in the relevant passages of the Confessions does not mention the opposition between Christianity and Plotinianism which results from the doctrine of creation.[60] We shall have to return to this fact later. It should be noted here, however, that this rather surprising omission furnishes a partial explanation for the fact that in some of the older studies on Augustine, the saint is represented as having, under the influence of Plotinus and others, taught various forms of emanationism.[61] Now certain presuppositions (of the philosophical rather than the historical order) may lead to the conclusion that Augustine could not reconcile the notion of creation with the absolute transcendence and simplicity of God; in a word, that he was faced with the same problem which confronted Plotinus. Against this, however, stands the mass of evidence that Augustine steadfastly and unequivocally maintained the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.

The earliest of the many texts that might be adduced in support of this assertion, is found in the *De Libero Arbitrio*, and dates from A. D. 388. We need only cite Augustine's words: [62]

[58] *Genesis*, I, 1. [59] Cf. *Exodus*, III, 14.

[60] Cf. Barion, *op. cit.*, p. 127; *Conf.*, VII, 9, 13-14, PL 32, 740-741; *ibid.*, VII, 20, 26-27, PL 32, 746-748, and VIII, 2, 3, PL 32, 750-751.

[61] Cf. Barion, *loc. cit.* The following should be mentioned: A. Ritschl, *Expositio doctrinae Augustini de creatione mundi*, Halle, 1843; A. Dorner, *Augustinus*, Berlin, 1873; G. Loesche, *De Augustino platonizante in doctrina de Deo disserenda*, Jena, 1880; *Id.*, "Plotin und Augustinus," *Zeitsch. f. kirchl. Wiss. und kirchl. Leben*, V (1884), p. 343.

[62] *De lib. arb.*, I, 2, 5, PL 32, 1224.

. . . nec quisquam de illo (scil. *Deo*) optime existimat, qui non eum omnipotentem, atque ex nulla particula commutabilem credit; bonorum omnium creatorem, quibus est ipse praestantior; rectorem quoque justissimum eorum omnium, quae creavit; nec ulla natura adjutum esse in creando, quasi qui non sibi sufficeret. Ex quo fit ut de nihilo creaverit omnia; de se autem non creaverit, sed genuerit quod sibi par esset, quem Filium Dei unicum dicimus, quem cum planius enuntiare conamur, Dei Virtutem et Dei Sapientiam nominamus, per quem fecit omnia, quae de nihilo facta sunt.

The contrast between the generation of the Word from the substance of the Father, on the one hand, and the creation of all things from nothing, on the other, establishes a clear distinction between God and the created world which would have been impossible for a Plotinian. According to the Catholic faith, Augustine says,[63] we must believe: "*ut creatura omnis . . . non de Dei natura, sed a Deo sit facta de nihilo.*" It would be tedious here to multiply citations on this point.[64]

For Augustine, the affirmation of creation *ex nihilo* was a reaction against the *nimia perversitas* into which he had fallen when, as an adherent of Manicheism, he had regarded God as an infinitely extended and very bright body, and every body, and every part of the universe, thus as a part of God.[65] The world, Augustine says, could not have been made from God's own substance (*de Te, de Ipso, de Dei substantia*), for then that which is not God would be equal to Him, and the changing to the changeless. The only alternative is that the world was

[63] *De gen. ad litt. liber imperfectus*, I, 2, PL 34, 221.

[64] Cf. e. g., *De vera religione*, XVIII, 35, PL 34, 137. (A. D. 389-391); *De actis cum Felice Manichaeo*, 2, 18, PL 42, 547 (A. D. 404); *Contra Secundinum Manich.*, 4, PL 42, 580 (A. D. 405-406); *Conf.*, XI, 5, 7, PL 32, 811-812 (A. D. 400); etc.

[65] Cf. *Conf.* VII, 1, 1-2, PL 32, 733-734; III, 7, 12, PL 32, 688; IV, 16, 31, PL 32, 706. Cf. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1931, p. 242. The whole of part 3, chap. 1, pp. 242-252, cannot be too strongly recommended.

made from nothing, for: *aliud praeter te non erat unde faceres ea.*[66] Again:

Quapropter, cum abs te quaero, unde sit facta universa creatura, quamvis in suo genere bona, Creatore tamen inferior, atque illo incommutabili permanente ipsa mutabilis; non invenies quid respondeas, nisi de nihilo factam esse fatearis.[67]

Augustine explains this creation *ex nihilo* by contrasting the action of God with that of a human artisan, who must work with materials already existing—thanks to God:

Quomodo autem fecisti coelum et terram, et quae machina tam grandis operationis tuae? Non enim sicut homo artifex formans corpus de corpore, arbitratu animae valentis imponere speciem quam cernit in semetipsa oculo interno. Et unde hoc valeret, nisi quia tu fecisti eam? Et imposuit speciem iam existenti et habenti unde esset, veluti terrae, aut lapdi, aut ligno, aut auro, aut id genus rerum cuilibet. Et unde ista essent, nisi tu instituisses ea? . . . Te laudant haec omnia creatorem omnium: sed tu quomodo facis ea? quomodo fecisti, Deus, coelum et terram? Non utique in coelo neque in terra fecisti coelum et terram; neque in aere aut in aquis, quoniam et haec pertinent ad coelum et terram; neque in universo mundo fecisti universum mundum, quia non erat ubi fieret antequam faceres ut esset, nec manu tenebas aliquid unde faceres coelum et terram. Nam unde tibi hoc quod tu non fecereas, unde aliquid faceres? Quid enim est nisi tu es?[68]

Without any pre-existing materials or substance upon, in or with which to work, God the *summum bonum* and *summum esse*, made creatures that they might be, *ut essent*, for whatever exists, is good.[69]

In Augustine's answer to the question: "Why did God create?" we find another sharp contrast to Plotinus. For the Christian doctor, creation is pre-eminently a free act of God, since He is completely free and independent of necessity. *Ubi*

[66] *Conf.*, XII, 7, 7, PL 32, 828. Cf. *De Genesi ad litt.*, VII, 2, 3, PL 34, 356-357.

[67] *Contra Secund. Manich.*, 8, PL, 42, 584.

[68] *Conf.* XI, 5, 7, PL 32, 811-812.

[69] *De vera religione*, XVIII, 35, PL 34, 137.

nulla indigentia, nulla necessitas; ubi nullus defectus, nulla indigentia. Nullus autem defectus in Deo: nulla ergo necessitas.[70] We can only say:[71] *Quia voluit, fecit.* The will of God is the sole cause of all things; to seek a cause for the will of God, is to seek that which does not exist: it is to seek something greater than the will of God.[72] If, however, we ask why God created *this* universe—a question of fact—the answer is that, since God is essentially good, and all things are good inasmuch as they exist, He created all things; for He was pleased by the goodness of His work.[73] There can be no question here of necessity or need; the Scriptural text: "*And God saw that it was good,*"[74] tells us that because of His goodness He made that which was made, for it is good.[75]

"Mostly rightly," says St. Augustine," do we believe that God made all things from nothing."[76] *All things*; for the things of this world, which are all in varying degrees one, good, beautiful, true, are not Unity, Goodness, Beauty, Truth. They proclaim their dependence on God.[77] The things of this world

[70] *De diversis quaestionibus 83*, q. 22, PL 40, 16.

[71] *Ad Orosium contra Priscill.*, 1, 2, PL, 42, 670.

[72] *De Genesi contra Manich.*, I, 2, 4, PL 34, 175: Causas . . . voluntatis Dei scire quaerunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa. Si enim habet causam voluntas Dei, est aliquid quod antecedat voluntatem Dei, quod nefas est credere. Qui ergo dicit: quare fecit Deus coelum et terram? respondendum est ei: quia voluit. Voluntas enim Dei causa est coeli et terrae, et ideo major est voluntas Dei quam coelum et terra. Qui autem dicit: Quare voluit facere coelum et terram? maius aliquid quaerit quam est voluntas Dei: nihil autem maius inveniri potest. Cf. *De diversis quest. 83*, q. 28, PL 40, 18.

[73] Cf. *De civitate Dei*, XI, 21, PL 41, 334-335.

[74] *Genesis*, I, 10.

[75] *De civ. Dei*, XI, 24, PL 41, 338: In eo vero quod dicitur, *Vidit Deus quia bonum* est; satis significatur, Deum nulla necessitate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est, id est, quia bonum est.

[76] *De fide et symbolo*, II, 2, PL 40, 183: . . . rectissime credimus omnia Deum fecisse de nihilo.

[77] Cf. e. g., *De div. quaest. 83*, q. 1, PL 40, 11: this text, which is concerned directly with the soul, is typical: Omne verum a veritate verum

cannot exist of themselves; Augustine pushes this certainty to its ultimate consequence, the universality of creation. There is no pre-existing subject for the divine creative action; even matter,[78] the receptacle of forms, which is formless, without beauty or intellibility,[79] which is the principle of mutability [80] and might even be spoken of as nothing,[81] must have been created.

The importance of this thesis is clear; it is a decisive aspect of the opposition between the Christian tradition which Augustine represented, and the Greek view of the universe as necessary and eternal. Matter, which is apparently the pre-existing chaos upon which the Platonic demiurge worked, introduces an inevitable dualism into Plato's system. Plotinus, who emphasized the opposition between the sensible and intelligible worlds even more strongly thanPlato, regards matter as the principle of imperfection and of evil; [82] in his necessary world, matter is eternal,[83] and his conception of matter seems to be the source of

est; et omnis anima eo anima est, quo vera anima est. Omnis igitur anima a veritate habet ut omnino anima sit. Aliud autem anima est, aliud veritas. Nam veritas falsitatem numquam patitur, anima vero saepe fallitur. Non igitur, cum a veritate anima est, a se ipsa est. Est autem veritas Deus: Deum igitur habet auctorem ut sit anima.

[78] On the creation of matter and forms, spiritual matter and corporeal matter, the role of the divine ideas in creation, etc., cf. the admirable chapter of M. Gilson: " La matière et les formes " (*op. cit.*, Part 3, chapter 2, pp. 253-267).

[79] Cf. *De Genesi contra Manich.*, I, 7, 11, PL 34, 178: Informis ergo illa materia quam de nihilo Deus fecit . . . *De Genesi ad litt. liber imperfectus*, IV, 11, PL 34, 224: . . . quae confusio materiae sic potest insinuari populari intelligentiae, si diceretur terra invisibilis et incomposita, vel inordinata . . . quia nullius intelligentia propter informitatem penetrari potest.

[80] Cf. *De Gen. ad litt.*, I, 14, 28, PL 34, 256. This is the ground for the doctrine of spiritual matter. Cf. *De Gen. ad litt.*, VII, 27, 39, PL 34, 370.

[81] *De diversis quaest.* 83, q. 54, PL 40, 38: . . . recte, quoniam caret omni specie, nihil dicitur.

[82] Cf. esp. *Enn.* I, 8, 4, 8, 10, 11.

[83] On the eternity of matter, and its independence of the One, from whom it is at the opposite extreme of darkness, cf. *Enn.* I, 8, 6-7; II, 1, 1; II, 1, 4; V, 8, 7; VI, 7, 33.

the acute dualism, and the most serious difficulties, which confront any attempt to discover a coherent Plotinian metaphysic.[84] Augustine, it is true, does not go so far as to say that matter is of its nature incapable of existing at all without form; in conformity with the text of Scripture,[85] he simply asserts that all things were created simultaneously. But if matter has no temporal anteriority, it precedes forms in the order of causality, as the condition of their subsistence.[86] For Augustine, then, it would seem not inconceivable that matter should exist without form; on the other hand, however, whatever is, is in virtue of its very existence, good; but this is possible only through its form. Hence Augustine's evident embarrassment in attempting to describe matter. In one passage, he seems to suggest that matter may be spoken of as *nihil*; but elsewhere, he is careful to maintain the reality of matter—it is *paene nihil*, but *non omnino nihil*. In any case, it is important for us to note that for St. Augustine, although matter has never existed apart from forms, although it is unintelligible without forms and yet must be considered as stripped of forms if we are to attain even a negative concept of it, it is not pure nothingness. It is a sort of intermediary between that which is *formatum*, and absolute *nihil*; it is as it were the mutability of things, that in virtue of which a thing has the capacity to receive some formal determi-

[84] Cf. G. Rodier, *op. cit.*, pp. 336-337.

[85] *Ecclesiasticus*, XVIII, 1: creavit omnia simul.

[86] *De Gen. ad litt.*, I, 15, 29, PL 34, 257: Non quia informis materia formatis rebus tempore prior est, cum sit utrumque simul concreatum, et unde factum est, et quod factum est. Sicut enim vox materia est verborum, verba vero formatam vocem incicant: non autem qui loquitur, prius emittit informem vocem, quam possit colligere atque in verba formare: ita creator Deus non priore tempore facit informem materiam, et eam postea per ordinem quarumque naturarum, quasi secunda consideratione formavit; formatam quippe creavit materiam. Sed quia illud unde fit aliquid, etsi non tempore, tamen quadam origine prius est quam illud quod inde fit, potuit dividere Scriptura loquendi temporibus, quod Deus faciendi temporibus non divisit. Cf. also *De Gen. ad litt.*, V, 5, 13, PL 34, 326; *Conf.* XII, 29, 40, PL 32, 843. *Materia informis* does not belong to the order of time, which begins with the creation of forms.

nation.[87] Even such a tenuous reality must somehow have come from the source of all that is; it must have been created:

> Sed qui praestat rebus formam, ipse praestat etiam posse formari . . . et ideo ipse unus est qui cuilibet rei, non solum ut pulchra sit, sed etiam ut pulchra esse possit attribuit. Quapropter rectissime credimus omnia Deum fecisse de nihilo: quia etiam si de aliqua materia factus est mundus, eadem ipsa natura de nihilo facta est, ut ordinatissimo Dei munere prima capacitas formarum fieret, ac deinde formarentur quaecumque formata sunt.[88]

But a further question remains for Augustine, and it is at once the most difficult of solution, and the crux of his doctrine. The first words of Genesis: *In principio creavit Deus coelum et terram*, were difficult to understand, but no matter how we may interpret them, they teach us that all that is created began to be, and that even time is a creature which had a beginning, and is not co-eternal with its Creator.[89] Here Augustine de-

[87] *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, q. 54, PL 40, 38: Quod autem corpus non est, et tamen aliquid est, aut anima est, aut ea melius aliquid. Deterius enim omni corpore nihil est; quia et si materiam quis dixerit, unde ipsum corpus fit, recte, quoniam caret omni specie, nihil dicitur. *De vera religione*, XVIII, 35, PL 34, 137: . . . Id ergo (scil. *nihil*) est, unde fecit Deus omnia, quod nullam speciem habet, nullamque formam; quod nihil est aliud quam nihil. Nam illud quod in comparatione perfectorum informe dicitur, si habet qliquid formae, quamvis exiguum, quamvis inchoatum, nondum est hihil.

Conf. XII, 6, 6, PL 32, 827: Mutabilitas enim rerum mutabilium ipsa capax est formarum omnium in quas mutantur res mutabiles. Et haec quid est? . . . Si dici posset, *Nihil aliquid*, et, *Est non est*, hoc eam dicerem; et tamen iam utcumque erat, ut species caperet istas visibiles et compositas.

Conf., XII, 8, 8, PL 32, 829: . . . illud autem totum prope nihil erat, quoniam adhuc omnino informe erat; iam tamen erat, quod formari poterat.

Conf., XII, 15, 22, PL 32, 834: . . . et tamen hoc paene nihil, in quantum non omnino nihil erat, ab illo utique erat a quo est quidquid est, quod utcumque aliquid est.

Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 256 (esp. note 1), 257; C. Boyer, *L'idée de vérité*, pp. 117-119.

[88] *De fide et symbolo*, II, 2, PL 40, 182-183.

[89] *De Gen. ad litt., lib. imperf.*, 3, 8, PL 34, 223: Sed quoquo modo hoc

clared himself in opposition to a thesis which, in spite of certain expressions in the *Timaeus*, had become a dogma for the schools of philosophy, even the *Platonici*. This was, of course, the thesis of the eternity of the world. It was possible for Augustine to fail to see that even Plato and Plotinus had not attained the true doctrine of creation. He even says of Plato: *apertissime dicat eos (scil., mundus et dii qui sunt in mundo) coepisse, et habere initium.*[90] But he was aware that here Plato (as Augustine understood him) and the *Platonici* parted company. One cannot be absolutely certain whether Plotinus is included, in the text to which I refer, among the erring *Platonici*, or whether we are to regard him as an ally of Moses. Had Augustine pushed the analysis of the concepts of creation and eternity further, he might have come to the conclusion of St. Thomas, that we cannot disprove the possibility of an eternal creation. But the fact is, as it will appear, that he rejected this notion not only on the ground of the revealed fact, but as a *de jure* impossibility. He could not have taken a stand more diametrically opposed to the philosophical thought and the religious and popular beliefs of late pagan antiquity; he seems to have been instinctively aware that he was proposing not only an unpopular solution to a vexing problem, but a new conception of the world and a new mentality, which is that of Christianity,—that he was asking for a reform of the understanding. This is what makes his discussion of the difficulties so important for us.[91]

The *Platonici*, Augustine says, attempt to prove the possibility of the eternity of the world by an analogy. Let us suppose that the foot of a man is from all eternity in the dust; the

se habeat (res enim secretissima est, et humanis coniecturis impenetrabilis), illud certe accipiendum est in fide, etiamsi modum nostrae cognitionis excedit, omnem creaturam habere initium; tempusque ipsum creaturam esse, ac per hoc ipsum habere initium, nec coaeternum esse Creatori.

[90] *De civit. Dei*, X, 31, PL 41, 311.

[91] Cf. Guitton, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-163.

footprint, then, would always be beneath it, although we cannot deny that the foot is the cause of the footprint; yet neither is prior to the other. Similarly, the world always existed, although it too, was made.[92] Augustine's answer to this objection, in the text under consideration, is not directly relevant here; his purpose is to show that the immortality of the soul does not require its existence *ab aeterno*.[93] What must be emphasized here, is that Augustine regarded the eternity of any creature as contrary not only to the teaching of Plato and to the faith, but as *unreasonable: ne aliquam (scil., creaturam) Creatori coaeternum esse dicemus, quod fides ratioque sana condemnat.*[94]

St. Augustine, as I have indicated, says that time is a creature. In so doing, he wished " to eliminate the tenacious illusion of a time prior to the existence of the world, and in a

[92] *De civit. Dei*, X, 31, PL 41, 311: Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium; quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset; sic, inquiunt, et mundus atque in illo dii creati, et semper fuerunt semper existente qui fecit, et tamen facti sunt.

Facere, it will be noted, is here used where we should expect Augustine to use *creare*. In one text (*Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, I, 23, 48, PL 42, 632-633), in interpretation of the text of Isaias XLV, 7, he suggests that it is better to use *facere* in the sense of true creation (*ut facere sit quod omnino non erat*) and *creare* in the sense of *condere, constituere, ordinare* (*creare autem, ex eo quod iam erat ordinando aliquid constituere*). Cf. also, the exegesis of the same text (*De moribus Manichaeorum*, 7, 9, PL 32, 1349), where Augustine also opposes *facio* and *creo*. However, he seems not to have been consistent in his use of the terms, and we must look to the words *ex nihilo* and to the context, in order to be certain of his meaning. He notes (*Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph., ibid.*) that the Greek κτίζειν is variously translated by *creare, condere* and *constituere*, whereas it most often means *facere* in the sense he has just assigned. Cf. J. Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 44, and the thesis of Sister M. P. Garvey, *St. Augustine, Christian or Neo-Platonist?* Marquette U. P., 1939, p. 145.

[93] *Ibid.*, c. 312: . . . Illa igitur omnis argumentatio dissoluta est, qua putatur nihil esse posse seine fine temporis, nisi quod initium non habet temporis. Inventa est enim animae beatitudo, quae cum initium temporis habuerit, finem temporis non habebit.

[94] *De civit. Dei*, XII, 15, 1, PL 41, 363.

moment of which God created " the world.[95] Both the *Platonici* and the Manicheans were faced with the following difficulty: if the world has not always existed, what was God doing before He created the world? Why did He remain idle during the countless centuries of time which could only be an empty duration, or a vacuum in which time was made? Augustine's answer is decisive. We must understand the " beginning " of Genesis as the first moment of time, which is a creature; if even time did not exist, then it is nonsense, and the result of the wanderings of the imagination, to speak of centuries, or of any time at all, which passed by supposition before time began to be:

At si cuiusquam volatilis sensus vagatur per imagines retro temporum, et te Deum omnipotentem et omnitenentem, coeli et terrae artificem, ab opere tanto, antequam id faceres, per innumerabilia saecula cessasse miratur, evigilet atque attendat, quia falsa miratur; nam unde poterant innumerabilia saecula praeterire, quae ipse non feceras, cum sis omnium saeculorum auctor et conditor? Aut quae tempora fuissent quae abs te condita non essent? Aut quomodo praeterirent, si numquam fuissent? . . . Idipsum enim tempus tu fecisse, nec praeterire potuerunt tempora antequam faceres tempora. Si autem ante coelum et terram nullum erat tempus, cur quaeritur quid tunc faciebas? Non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus.[96]

The fallacy of supposing a time prior to creation, is that of trying to measure by time, the eternity of God; to measure Him Who is unchangeable and in Whom there is no succession, by His creature, time, the mode of duration proper to the mutability of creatures.[97] God is before time, not in time, but

[95] Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

[96] *Conf.* XI, 13, 15, PL 32, 815. Cf. *De Gen. contra Manich.*, I, 2, PL 34, 175.

[97] *De civit. Dei*, XI, 6, PL 41, 321: . . . Si enim recte discernuntur aeternitas et tempus, quod tempus sine aliqua mobili mobilitate non est, in aeternitate autem nulla mutatio est; quis non videat quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret . . . ; cuius motionis et mutationis cum aliud atque aliud, quae simul non esse possunt, cedit atque succedit, . . . tempus sequeretur?

Ibid., XII, 15, 2, col. 364: . . . Ubi enim nulla creatura est, cuius mutabilibus motibus tempora peragitur, tempora omnino esse non possunt.

in eternity, which is a changeless present. This is expressed in a characteristically magnificent passage of the Confessions:

> Nec tu tempore tempora praecedis, alioquin non omnia tempora praecederes. Sed praecedis omnia praeterita, celsitudine semper praesentis aeternitatis; et superas omnia futura, quia illa futura sunt, et cum venerint praeterita erunt, tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficiunt. Anni tui nec eunt nec veniunt; isti autem nostri et eunt et veniunt, ut omnes veniant. Anni tui omnes simul stant, quoniam stant; nec euntes a venientibus excluduntur, quia non transeunt; isti autem nostri omnes erunt, cum omnes non erant. Anni tui dies unus; et dies tuus non quotidie, sed hodie, quia hodiernus tuus non cedit crastino, neque enim succedit hesterno; hodiernus tuus aeternitas; ideo coaeternum genuisti, cui dixisti, *Ego hodie genui Te.* Omnia tempora tu fecisti, et ante omnia tempora tu es, nec aliquo tempore non erat tempus.[98]

Time, created duration, is finite and limited; all time, however great its extension, is, compared to eternity, less than insignificant: it is as nothing.[99] We can say that the world has existed from all time; but the concept of a creature coeternal with God is contradictory and impossible, "for it supposes the attribution of a homogeneous mode of duration to heterogeneous modes of being." [100]

Augustine, in spite of his difficulties with the problem of time,[101] perceived that the problem of duration in time anterior to creation is a pseudo-problem. We may be unable to understand time—and, *a fortiori*, eternity,—but this does not excuse us if we confuse them, or fail to recognize that the divine knowl-

[98] *Conf.* XI, 13, 16, PL 32, 815.

[99] *De civit. Dei*, XII, 12, PL 41, 359-360: . . . considerent nihil esse diuturnum, in quo est aliquid extremum, et omnia saeculorum spatia definita, si aeternitati interminatae comparentur, non exigua existimanda esse, sed nulla.

[100] Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 247, and the texts cited *ibid.*, note 2. Eg. *De civit. Dei*, XII, 16, PL 41, 365: . . . Non tamen dubito nihil omnino creaturae creatori esse coaeternum.

[101] Cf. Guitton, *op. cit.*; Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-252.

edge and the divine action are equally and perfectly simple,[102] and yet God's knowledge embraces even the infinite, which is finite in His understanding.[103]

Another difficulty must now be faced. If God does not create the world *ab aeterno*, does not this imply a denial of the divine simplicity and eternity, by requiring a new act of the will of God, a decision to create at some particular moment? For the will of God is not a creature, but precedes creatures, since nothing would be created unless the will to create it had existed in the creator. Now the will of God is His very substance. But if something new comes to be in the divine substance, that substance is not eternal. On the other hand, if God's will to create is eternal, why is not the creature eternal?[104] The answer to this objection is now easy for Augustine. Time, which is ever flowing, and eternity, which is utterly without succession or change, are so dissimilar that it is impossible to compare them; and in eternity, everything is present, there is no past or future.[105] God, as Augustine says in another passage, can proceed to a new work in virtue of an eternal plan and will. "Before" and "after" are only in temporal things; we can not speak of any change in the will of

[102] Cf. *Conf.*, XI, 31, 41, PL 32, 826: . . . Sicut ergo nosti in principio coelum et terram sine varietate notitiae tuae, ita fecisti in principio coelum et terram sine distentione actionis tuae.

[103] Cf. *De civit. Dei*, XII, 18, PL 41, 367-368.

[104] *Conf.* XI, 10, 12, PL 32, 814: Si enim nullus motus in Deo novus exstitit, et voluntas nova ut creaturam conderet quam numquam ante condiderat; quomodo iam vera aeternitas, ubi oritur voluntas quae non erat? Neque enim voluntas Dei creatura est, sed ante creaturam: quia non crearetur aliquid, nisi creatoris voluntas praecederet. Ad ipsam ergo Dei substantiam pertinet voluntas eius. Quod si exortum est aliquid in Dei substantia quod prius non erat, non veraciter dicitur aeterna illa substantia: si autem voluntas Dei sempiterna erat ut esset creatura; cur non sempiterna et creatura?

[105] *Ibid.*, cap. 11, 13, col. 814: . . . paululum rapiat splendorem semper stantis aeternitatis, et comparet cum temporibus numquam stantibus, et videat esse incomparabilem; . . . non autem praeterire quidquam in aeterno, sed totum esse praesens. . . .

God. By one and the same eternal and unchangeable will he brought it about that things should not be, as long as they were not, and that they should be, when they began to be.[106] Similarly, God, Whose wisdom is multiple in its simplicity, multiform in its uniformity, can embrace the incomprehensible in an act of understanding which itself is beyond comprehension; even if He should ceaselessly create new beings entirely different from their predecessors, they would be ordered and foreseen in an eternal act.[107]

Augustine's conception of the radical origin of things is *toto coelo* different from that of Plotinus. There is no need, then, for a detailed comparison of Augustine's doctrine of creation of creation with the Plotinian ideas which have been set forth in the first section of this paper, although this would reveal, in what we must regard here as subsidiary aspects of Augustine's doctrine, interesting resemblances and points of contact with Plotinus, adaptations and transpositions of Plotinian ideas which were either in accord with revelation or useful for Scriptural exegesis. In regard to the central problem with which this paper is concerned, the saint is moving on another plane and in another world from Plotinus; the problems which he had to solve, the objections which he answered, were not those that Plotinus discussed—these really concerned Augustine not at all.

[106] *De civit. Dei*, XII, 17, 2, PL 42, 376: . . . Potest ad opus movum, non novum, sed sempiternum adhibere consilium . . . prius et posterius, in rebus prius non existentibus et posterius existentibus fuit. In illo autem non alteram praecedentem altera subsequens mutavit aut abstulit voluntatem, sed una eademque sempiterna et immutabili voluntate res quas condidit, et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non fuerunt, et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt. . . .

[107] *Ibid.*, c. 18, col. 368: . . . cuius, sapientia simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis, tam incomprehensibili comprehensione omnia incomprehensibilia comprehendit, ut quaecumque nova et dissimilia consequentia praecedentibus si semper facere vellet, inordinata et improvisa habere non posset; nec ea praevideret ex proximo tempore, sed aeterna praescientia contineret.

III. Conclusion

The doctrine of the free creation of the world in time, as developed and explained by Augustine, is completely Christian. Augustine, in the texts which have been studied, is attempting to give a rational explanation of the data of Revelation, in so far as this is possible. There is no need to insist further on the completely non-Plotinian character of this doctrine. But a disturbing question suggests itself. Was Saint Augustine aware of the distance that separated him from Plotinus?

Augustine tells us that the *Platonici* (*philosophi, quos ceteris non immerito fama et gloria praelatos videmus*) perceived much of the correct doctrine regarding the relations between the world and God, recognizing in God the unchangeable, simple principle of all things, the maker of the essentially changing and contingent world.[108] Was Plotinus included among these *Platonici*? In the *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine includes the name of Plotinus in the list of those whom he describes as Platonists, viz., Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry and Apuleius.[109] Further,

[108] *De civit. Dei*, VIII, 6, PL 41, 231-232: . . . Viderunt quidquid mutabile est, non esse summum Deum; et ideo omnem animam mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcenderunt, quaerentes summum Deum. Deinde viderunt omnem speciem in re quacumque mutabili, qua est quidquid illud est, quoquo modo et qualiscumque natura est, non esse posse nisi ab illo qui vere est, quia incommutabiliter est . . . Propter hanc incommutabilitatem et simplicitatem intellexerunt eum et omnia ista fecisse, et ipsum a nullo fieri potuisse. . . . Quod autem recipit magis et minus, sine dubitatione mutabile est. Unde ingeniosi et docti et in his exercitati homines facile collegerunt, non esse in eis rebus primam speciem, ubi mutabilitas esse convincitur. Cum igitur in earum conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque speciosa essent, et si omni specie carere possent, omnino nulla essent, viderunt esse aliquid ubi prima esset et incommutabilis, et ideo nec comparabilis: atque ibi esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset, et ex quo facta cuncta essent. Ita quod notum est Dei, ipse manifestavit eis, cum ab eis invisibilia eius, per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspecta sunt; sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas (*Rom.* I, 19-20): a quo etiam visibilia et temporalia cuncta creata sunt.

[109] *De civit. Dei*, VIII, 12, PL 41, 237: . . . Ideo quippe hos potissimum

when Augustine mentions, in the famous text of the *Confessions*,[110] that he had read "certain books of the Platonists," he is, without doubt, referring in part at least, to the works of Plotinus, for, Paul Henry has shown that these books were mainly, probably only, the Enneads, with which Augustine became acquainted early in his career; the text of the fourth chapter of the *De Beata Vita*, as emended by Père Henry, confirms the view that he read some treatises of the Enneads during his sojourn in Milan.[111] In view of the established fact that Augustine had read much of Plotinus, and considering both the many evidences of the influence of Plotinian thought on the mind of the great African Doctor[112] and the acknowledged veneration in which Augustine held Plotinus, it is highly improbable that, when he mentions the *Platonici* without making any exception or qualification, he intends to exclude Plotinus. Are we to conclude, then, that Augustine was under the impression that Plotinus had taught the doctrine of creation?

Serious reasons must be urged against such a conclusion. In none of the relevant texts in the writings of Augustine has the Christian doctor unequivocally asserted that the Platonists had developed the explicit notion of creation *ex nihilo*. Further, St. Augustine states that the *Platonici* (and in this, he thought, they were false to the clear teaching of Plato) held for the eternity of the world. Now, perhaps the most salient feature of Augustine's doctrine of creation is that he rejects, as utterly

elegi, quoniam de uno Deo qui fecit coelum et terram, quanto melius senserunt, tanto ceteris gloriosiores et illustriores habentur; in tantum aliis praelati iudicio posterorum . . . recentiores tamen philosophi nobilissimi quibus Plato sectandus placuit, noluerint se dici Peripateticos aut Academicos, sed Platonicos. Ex quibus sunt valde nobilitati Graeci Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyrius; in utraque autem lingua, id est et Graeca et Latina, Apuleius Afer exstitit Platonicus nobilis.

[110] *Conf.* VII, 9, 13, PL 32, 740.

[111] Cf. P. Henry, S. J., "Augustine and Plotinus," *Journal of Theological Studies*, XXVIII (1937), pp. 1-23; pp. 8-9.

[112] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

impossible, the notion of creation *ab aeterno*. It would seem, then, that he could hardly have regarded the opinion of the Platonists with respect to the origin of the world as a doctrine of creation. Again, since Plotinus, for whom the world is an eternally necessary emanation from the One, never once considers the possibility of creation *ex nihilo*, it is difficult to conceive how St. Augustine could have so missed the whole trend of Plotinus' thought in regard to the radical origin of things, as to have confused a Neo-Platonic procession with Christian creation. Finally, another passage of the *De Civitate Dei* serves to place the issue in a rather doubtful light. After extolling the merits of Plato, Augustine explains how he proposes to make use of the great philosopher's opinions, and of the truths in regard to God which may have been taught by his most illustrious disciples:

> Ex his tamen quae apud eum leguntur, sive quae dixit, sive quae ab aliis dicta esse narravit atque conscripsit, quae sibi placita viderentur, quaedam commemorari et huic operi inseri oportet a nobis, vel ubi suffragantur religioni verae, quam fides nostra suscipit ac defendit, vel ubi ei videtur esse contrarius, quantum ad istam de uno Deo et pluribus quaestionem, propter vitam, quae post mortem futura est, veraciter beatam. Fortassis enim qui Platonem ceteris philosophis gentium longe recteque praelatum acutius atque veracius intellexisse atque secuti esse fama celebriori laudantur, aliquid tale de Deo sentiunt ut in illo inveniatur et causa subsistendi, et ratio intelligenci, et ordo vivendi. . . .[113]

Perhaps, Augustine intimates, Plato's greatest followers,—and we can safely take this to refer at any rate to Plotinus,—were of the opinion that the cause of the world's existence is found in God. Evidently, then, it would be dangerous to press the meaning of the long passage in the sixth chapter, which follows this text almost immediately; it is a tribute of admiration and gratitude to men who had seen something of God's nature from His visible works, and recognized in Him the ultimate cause

[113] *De civit. Dei*, VIII, 4, PL 41, 228-229.

and maker of this world. Augustine is far from asserting that they had grasped the whole truth, or that they had consistently maintained, and logically developed, the truth that they had glimpsed; for, even though they had come so much closer to the truth about the one God than had other thinkers, had not the great *Platonici*, and even Plato himself, commended sacrifice to false gods, thus failing to reject polytheism?[114]

It is none the less a striking fact that Augustine, apart from the very probable inclusion of Plotinus among the Platonists who taught the eternity of the world, speaks of the great Neo-Platonist's views on the relation between the world and God, only in terms which indicate warm approval. In view of the indecisive—and, one is tempted to add, perhaps deliberately vague—language used in the texts which have been cited, this is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Augustine read the doctrine of creation into Plotinus. Most probably, he read the Enneads through Christian eyes and with a Christian mind;[115] and it is easy enough to find passages in which Plotinus says that the One is simple and the principle of all things, but distinct from them. But these considerations, as well as the possibility of taking some of Plotinus' metaphors in a Christian sense, and the possibility that the true meaning of Plotinus may have been less evident in the lost translation used by Augustine, authorize the historian to conclude only that the Saint probably did not understand Plotinus' doctrine as a necessitarian emanationism, diametrically opposed to the doctrine of creation which he himself, the Christian Doctor and Scriptural exegete, defended with great zeal, and, on the ground he had chosen for debate, with the brilliance and profundity characteristic of Aurelius Augustinus.

[114] *De civit. Dei*, VIII, 12, PL 41, 237 . . . Sed hi omnes (*scil. Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyrius, Apuleius*), et ceteri eiusmodi et ipse Plato, diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putaverunt.

[115] Cf. P. Henry, *loc. cit.*, p. 11; C. Boyer, *Christianisme et néo-platonisme dans la formation de Saint Augustin*, Paris, 1920, pp. 130-131.

To conclude, then, it is clear that Augustine, in his doctrine of creation, was inspired not by Plotinus but by Revelation; nothing could be more foreign to his thought than the Plotinian theory of procession, for, as A. C. Pegis has put it: "If the philosophy of Plotinus means anything, it means a perfectly articulated system from which the notion of creation is absent"; [116] and for Plotinus, "the production of the universe is not the making of beings, but the eternal and internal differentiation, through procession, of a reality which is radically immortal." [117] Need I add that the Plotinian world is a thought-world in which these differentiated modes of reality are different only in degree, whereas the world of Augustine is a contingent but real world, for it is the good creature of an infinitely good God? Augustine seems not to have realized the extent of his difference with Plotinus, but as a Christian, he accepted, professed and justified a totally different view of the world.

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[116] A. C. Pegis, *Saint Thomas and the Greeks, Aquinas Lecture for 1939*, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1939, p. 72.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

WHAT KIND OF SCIENCE IS PSYCHOLOGY?

I.

BEFORE answering that question, we must make a few essential distinctions. Science can be understood in three different ways:

1) Science in the strictest sense, or positive science. This kind of science is strictly deterministic, it aims at perfect measurements, total quantification and certain predictability. Physics is a positive science.

2) Science in a broader sense, including what is sometimes called the cultural or moral sciences. They are not strictly deterministic and they can measure, quantify and predict only to a small extent. History is a cultural science.

3) Science in the broadest sense, including the philosophical and theological sciences.[1]

Our question becomes then: Under what heading shall we put psychology? Is psychology a positive science, or a cultural science, or a philosophical science?

If we ask the psychologists, we shall notice a great diversity of opinions.

Some of them consider psychology as a part of philosophy and will therefore call it a science only in the broadest meaning of that word. This conception, which was held universally a century ago, has few defenders nowadays, outside of philosophical circles.

Others claim that psychology is a positive science. They

[1] The often mentioned dichotomy "science and philosophy" refers generally to positive science, and ignores the broad intermediate field of the "cultural" sciences. It would be clearer to say "science and metaphysics," because certain parts of philosophy can hardly be distinguished from related cultural sciences. Between positive science and metaphysics, the opposition is radical, not a matter of degree, but of nature.

point with pride to the progressive quantification of psychology, to the figures, the curves and the correlations yielded by strict experimental methods. They admit that some domains have not yet been surveyed, but they claim that techniques will be discovered to open them for scientific investigation. It is their firm conviction that no part of the psychological field lies outside the scope of their strictly quantitative procedures.

Finally, quite a number of psychologists, especially among the clinical practitioners, emphasize the technical, personal, artistic aspects of psychology. For many problems the strictly experimental methods are of no avail; a long experience, some kind of personal talent, and artistic intuition are required.

Hence the psychologists themselves do not agree about the nature of psychology. Some of them call it a positive science, some consider it as a cultural science, whereas others put it among the philosophical sciences. Psychology is variously considered as a science in the strict sense, in the broad sense, or only in the broadest sense.

What shall we think of it? It seems to us that these answers are right in what they affirm and wrong in what they deny. Psychology is a positive science, a cultural science and a philosophical science. Or, to put it more exactly, psychology can cover its domain only by using in turns the methods of positive science, of the cultural sciences and of philosophy. It is the greatness but also the curse of psychology that it cannot be squeezed into any of these cultural categories. It extends over the entire range of human knowledge.

II.

What then is the subject-matter of psychology? Here again, *quot capita, tot sententiae.* We must make a choice, and we shall say that psychology is the science of conscious life.

At once, some scholastic philosophers will object: "Why do

you restrict the scope of psychology? Psychology was historically, is etymologically and should be logically the science of the soul." That is right, if we consider only philosophical psychology. But what becomes of empirical and experimental psychology? Have they no right to existence? And if they do, the soul is not the only object of psychology, since we do not experience our soul and we cannot experiment with it.

Altogether different is the objection raised by the behaviorists. Strict behaviorism, of pre-depression vintage, claimed that consciousness is only an epiphenomenon of the physiological processes, which it is quite useless, or even impossible, to investigate. That position leads to such impossible consequences, that very few psychologists hold it nowadays.

The position of broad behaviorism is more worthy of our attention. Consciousness exists, it is very important in man's life, it gives us much information about our mental processes; but it cannot be investigated scientifically and it should therefore be excluded from psychology. A choice has to be made. If we want a strictly scientific psychology, we must exclude consciousness. If we include it, let us give up the hope of ever having a real science of psychology. We want a real science, and therefore we forego consciousness and we concentrate our efforts upon behavior. This dilemma holds, but we do not agree with the proposed solution. We would rather give up some of the scientific claims of psychology, if that is the price for keeping consciousness.

One more serious objection comes from psychoanalysis and related schools. If the subject-matter of psychology is conscious life, what becomes of the unconscious?—To which we reply: the unconscious phenomena are known to us only through consciousness, either because they have been conscious, or because they will become conscious, or because, through their conscious effects, they are at least indirectly conscious. And so

this important domain comes indirectly under the scope of our definition.

These considerations will not satisfy the conflicting parties. No definition of psychology will carry the universal approval of the psychological profession, which is precisely a strong argument for the point made in this article. Yet, since we must have a definition to start with, we repeat that, to our mind, psychology is the science of conscious life.

III.

Why can psychology not be merely a positive science? Why can conscious life not be exhaustively studied with the methods used by the physico-chemical sciences?

This question can be answered only by philosophy. For two reasons. First, because no positive science can judge itself. To judge a science is not a scientific pursuit. No scientist can assess the limitations of his own field by means of the methods used in surveying it. Recourse must be had to a higher tribunal. The second reason is peculiar to psychology. We are asking whether conscious life can be studied with strictly scientific methods. We can answer that question only if we know exactly what conscious life is, and we can get that kind of information only from philosophy.

The best way to understand conscious life is to show its position in the totality of being. Created beings can be classified in the following hierarchical scale: Mineral—Plant—Animal—Man—(Angel).[2] Taking conscious life in the meaning of material conscious life, we see that it is found in animals and in men. Minerals have neither consciousness nor life, plants

[2] We bracket the Angels, because for human reason they are only hypothetical beings, whose essence we can study but whose existence we cannot demonstrate, somewhat as chemistry was able, through the table of Mendelejeff, to study the properties of certain elements before they had been discovered.

have life without consciousness and the angels have consciousness without material life.[3]

With the exception of animals and men, each one of these degrees of being is the object of a specialized science or group of sciences. The minerals are investigated by the physico-chemical sciences, the plants by the biological sciences, angels by that part of philosophy which is sometimes called "Angelology." Both animals and men are investigated, in that which makes them different from all lower beings, by the same group of sciences: the psychological sciences.[4] From this simple fact much confusion is bound to derive. There is a great danger that man will be considered as an animal, or that the animals will be treated as if they were human beings. Present day psychology has overcome the danger of anthropomorphism, but that man is often treated as "nothing more than "a glorified animal can hardly be denied.

Strictly positive sciences are to be found only on the lower level, among the sciences which investigate material reality of the minerals. It is generally admitted that physics is the ideal type of exact, positive science. On this lowest level of reality the quantitative experimental methods are at their best, and nothing seems to lie outside of their scope, except perhaps the ultimate nature of matter.

The sciences of the second level, which study the plants, have also a very high standing. Their progress has been amazing and daily they make new powerful strides into the mysterious domain of living beings. Yet, more often than physics or chemistry, the biological sciences meet a baffling problem, a

[3] Of course, Angels do possess life and even a more perfect kind of life than any material being. But their life is purely immaterial, whereas we treat here only of material life.

[4] Zoology is a biological science which is primarily interested in animals as living, not as conscious beings. When it studies instincts and similar phenomena it intrudes into a domain which belongs properly to animal psychology.

reality which they can neither avoid nor explain, the reality of life. The fundamental conflict between Vitalism and Mechanism has always disturbed the harmony of the biological sciences, and will continue to do so as long as scientists tackle the arduous problem of life.

The long neglected scientific study of the animal as animal has recently been taken up by animal psychology. Young and promising as this science may be, it will never reach the standing of biology, not to mention that of physics or chemistry. More even than the study of life, the positive study of consciousness, knowledge and orexis presents insuperable difficulties. To neglect these topics as so many psychologists do, is not a real solution. And those who try to investigate them with strictly scientific methods may find many important facts, but they will soon discover that the real nature of these processes is not amenable to scientific treatment.[5]

A fortiori is this true in human psychology. Here again many facts have been accumulated, and their number increases daily. But most of them belong to the lower human functions: reflexes, sensations, movement, rote memory, etc. The yield is much poorer in the domain of the higher, specifically human functions (intellect and will), and we have the impression that here scientific psychology scratches the surface without ever penetrating to the real core. All the efforts devoted to the scientific study of human intelligence and free will have not brought us nearer to an understanding of their real nature.

Finally the highest level of created reality, that of the Pure Spirits, lies entirely above the scope of the positive sciences.

[5] Animal psychology tries to study animal consciousness, knowledge and striving. It has discovered many interesting facts about these phenomena, because it uses, consciously or unconsciously, human frames of reference, those vague philosophical notions without which consciousness and knowledge could not even be conceived. But it is quite unable to penetrate, with its own methods, into the intimate nature of these processes, to give of them a mechanical interpretation, i. e. the only kind of interpretation which a positive science can and should attempt.

Hence we can conclude that the perfect conditions for a completely exhaustive positive science are found only on the lowest level of reality, the level of the minerals. As he goes higher, from minerals to plants, to animals, to man, the scientist meets more and more problems which do not yield to his usual methods, until he arrives at the threshhold of purely spiritual reality where he has to give up even his attempts.

IV.

These are the facts. What is the reason for these facts? Why do the different domains of beings behave so differently under scientific inquiry? Philosophy alone can give us an answer.[6]

All material reality is composed of two complementary principles: prime matter and substantial form. Prime matter is a principle of limitation and of imperfection, form is a principle of expansion and of perfection. In the composite being quantity, extension and mechanical necessity derive ultimately from matter, whereas quality, intensity and spontaneity are explained by form. Prime matter cannot exist alone, it co-exists necessarily with a complementary form. Substantial form can exist alone, as a pure form or spirit, but does then no longer belong to material reality.

Hence the domain of positive science lies between the two extremes of pure matter without form and pure form without matter and includes the combinations of the two principles. Several of these combinations are possible. Matter can be united to an individual form of greater or lesser perfection. When the form possesses a high degree of perfection, its influence will be clearly visible in the material being, v. g. in a greater spontaneity. Other material beings, whose form is less

[6] Although we put our explanations in terms of thomistic philosophy, we believe that they could easily be translated in terms of any philosophy which admits the reality of mind and its fundamental distinction from matter.

perfect, will show a corresponding increase of material causality, v. g. in their greater inertia and in a more mechanical activity. Those combinations in which the influence of the form is not too strong constitute the most satisfying objects of strictly scientific investigation. As the formal component becomes more perfect and more powerful, the scientific difficulties increase.

In the minerals matter and form counterbalance each other perfectly, that means that every activity and quality depends on matter as much as on form. On this level the combination of pure quantity with quality produces quantified, measurable quality. The combination of pure inertia with spontaneity produces mechanical, predictable activity. Thus are realized the ideal conditions of strictly scientific investigation: quantity and determinism. Minerals have their form, but (to use a comparison which our previous explanations have sufficiently explained) that form is so immersed in and penetrated with matter that it exhausts its perfection in simply actuating the matter. Although all active qualities of minerals derive ultimately from their form, this form is so thoroughly materialized that it can produce only mechanical, measurable, predictable effects.

In plants again we have a combination of matter and form. Here also form is deeply immersed in matter. Deeply, but not entirely. We could say that in the plants the form emerges somewhat above matter, that it is able to imprint its specific mark upon the plant's activities and endow them with a beginning of spontaneity. Here we find internal finality. Each single activity of a plant, considered separately, can and should be explained exhaustively in terms of physics and chemistry; yet, if we consider these same activities in their totality, in their general direction, we must admit that they are not perfectly mechanical. All of them are somehow directed from inside towards an immanent goal, the good of the plant. Life

is precisely the capacity for such immanent activities. Hence the biologist will have smooth sailing as long as he studies the single activities of the plant, but he will meet real difficulties when he considers their general trend. As soon as he tries to explain life, the biologist will consciously or unconsciously turn into a philosopher.

In the animal the predominance of form over matter is greater than in plants. Hence some activities of the animal, although still penetrated with matter, must be explained primarily as manifestations of the form. Because the animal is a material being, positive science can investigate without difficulty many aspects of animal life. But when it studies the animal precisely as animal, in the functions which distinguish it from all lower beings, in its consciousness, its knowledge and its appetite, a complete explanation in strictly scientific terms becomes impossible.

Finally, in man too we find a combination of matter and form. But a very original one. Here form has achieved a real degree of independence from matter and is able to produce purely immaterial effects for which matter is only a necessary condition. We mean intellection and volition. They are essential in human life and to overlook them is to neglect that in man which is specifically human. Yet the nature of these operations is entirely outside the scope of strictly scientific research.

Of course, man can also be studied at different levels, and the lower the level, the more strictly scientific methods will yield results. Anthropometry and anatomy, primarily interested in dimensions, structures and shapes, study man as if he were a mineral. Physiology investigates him as if he were a plant, and interprets his single activities in terms of physics and chemistry; as soon however as it takes a global view of man's living activities, it meets the unavoidable problems of life and finality. Next we can consider man as an animal and study in him the lower conscious functions. Although many of their

aspects can still be treated scientifically, the difficulties increase as well as the conflicting views of the psychologists. When finally man is considered in that which makes him properly a human being, in his intellectual and volitional activities, science feels almost powerless and can just skim the problems; the real nature of these functions can be studied only by philosophy.[7]

Hence the remarkable unanimity of anatomists and physiologists as contrasted with the conflicting statements of psychologists. Hence in all textbooks of psychology the emphasis on lower, psycho-physiological functions, as compared with the scant treatment granted to the higher human functions, such as universal knowledge or free decision. Hence the scientific impression produced by the psychology of the inferior functions as opposed to the vague uncertainty prevailing in the study of the higher functions.

It follows that man, in his complex totality, must be studied partly by scientific methods and partly by philosophical procedures. He should be approached from two directions: from below, when we consider him as the highest kind of material being and from above when we consider him as the lowest form of spirit. The first approach will be strictly scientific, the latter philosophical. Their combined results will constitute a psychology which is neither pure science nor pure philosophy. We must admit this dualistic character of psychology, because we must admit the dualistic character of man. If we forget that man straddles the boundary line between matter and spirit, we shall not study man, but either an animal or an angel. If

[7] The objection could be raised that experimental psychology can establish that man has universals and that the animal has not. We do not believe that this is true. The term "Universal" is not a scientific concept (scientific in the strict sense). Furthermore a fact which has been established by strictly scientific methods is accepted by all investigators, which is certainly more than can be said about the presence of universal ideas in man. Most modern psychologists are nominalists.

we try to squeeze all the data about man either in philosophy or in positive science, we shall have a chapter of metaphysics or a treatise of physiology, but never a real human psychology.

V.

Experimental psychology, the strictly scientific approach to psychological problems, tries to measure its objects. There are however different kinds of measurement, and not every one of them is suitable for strictly scientific investigation. It is an illusion of many experimentalists to believe that the use of measurements and of statistics will automatically solve any problem to which they are applied. The measurements and statistics lavished upon the problem of intelligence have not brought us much nearer to a real understanding of the nature and workings of that faculty.[8]

Psychological phenomena can be measured in two totally different ways. We can call them direct and indirect measurement. We have direct measurement when we try to express quantitatively a higher process or function either in itself (which seems well nigh impossible), or at least in its effects or manifestations. We speak of indirect measurement when such a function is reduced to its material components or conditions, which can then be measured directly.

The measurement of intelligence by means of tests is an example of direct measurement. The exterior manifestations of intelligence are computed quantitatively and compared with the performance of other intelligences. We shall have an indirect measurement of intellectual activity if and when we are able to measure the complicated brain processes underlying such activity.

[8] Spearman's statistical work on this subject demonstrated that there is a G-factor, but it did not tell us much about its nature. To explain its nature the great British psychologist is obliged to use considerations which are primarily philosophical.

Psychology has accumulated a great wealth of direct measurements, which are very useful for practical purposes, but which can never, by themselves, give us a strictly scientific explanation of the phenomena from which they derive. Such an explanation can come only from indirect measurements. Psychology as a positive science should try to explain the emotions by investigating their physiological components rather than by measuring the direction or the intensity of the gestures which accompany them. It should study human temperament and character along the lines of Kretschmer and Sheldon,[9] who investigate the physiological and anatomical foundations of higher psychic phenomena, rather than to rely exclusively upon scales or questionnaires and the statistical elaboration of their results.

Psychology should follow the example of the biological sciences. Physiology has really explained the process of digestion when it has described it in terms of organic chemistry. And in general, explanations on any level of material reality are strictly scientific when they can be formulated in terms of the lower levels. Hence the increasing shortcomings of such a scientific explanation as we go higher in the scale of beings. Psychology must look for physiological explanations, physiology should speak in terms of physics and chemistry. That means that positive science must neglect that which distinguishes each level from its inferiors. It can study only the material aspects of its objects; the more the formal component becomes important, the more a merely scientific explanation falls short of its goal, the more a complementary philosophical interpretation is required.

Let us apply these remarks to psychology. In all human activities there is a material and a formal component. But,

[9] Sheldon, W. H., *The Varieties of Human Physique*, New York, Harper, 1940. Sheldon, W. H., *The Varieties of Temperament*, New York, Harper, 1942.

whereas in the inferior functions the material component dominates, in the higher processes it is only a condition, a merely extrinsic element which, even if thoroughly described and measured, would hardly throw any light on that process itself. A physiological interpretation of the knee-jerk is perfectly satisfying, and philosophy could hardly add anything to it. But even if we were able to describe accurately the physiological factors involved in that supreme human activity by which man is conscious of himself as a person, we would have only an imperfect explanation. The best way of understanding that Ego-consciousness is to consider it as a humble participation of the supreme Self-Presence, Self-Knowledge and Self-Volition which is identically the Pure Act. Man's higher functions are best understood if we compare them with the activities of God and of the angels. Modern philosophers, even among the Scholastics, tend to overlook the great importance of Angelology for the study of man's higher activities. S. Thomas made a frequent use of such a comparison in order to understand human intelligence and human will. Fr. J. Maréchal, S. J., calls Angelology a metaphysics of pure intelligence [10] and a contemporary author remarks very wisely: "Without the idea of angels we have a poorer knowledge of that creature who once was lower than they, though he was higher than worm or ox." [11]

VI.

Scientific psychology and philosophical psychology, although studying the same object are different branches of knowledge. Their methods are not the same: observation and experiment on one side, reflexion and reasoning on the other. Using them indiscriminately would result in a lower efficiency for both. Philosophers are generally poor experimentalists, and scientific

[10] J. Maréchal, S. J., *Le Point de départ de la Métaphysique,* Cahier V, Louvain, 1926, p. 213.

[11] Van Doren, Mark, *Liberal Education,* New York, Holt, 1943, p. 20.

psychologists are wary about "arm-chair theories." It would be unwise to force them to work together. Yet, this separation has its dangers. Philosophical psychology is topheavy, with all the emphasis on the rational functions and too little to say about the lower functions. Experimental psychology looks microcephalic, with the emphasis on the lower processes and few solid data on the higher processes.

Whoever studies psychology not just in order to learn a few facts or techniques, but really in order to understand the whole man, should therefore turn to both philosophical as well as scientific psychology. A complete knowledge of man's conscious life is impossible without both. Methods and procedures must be kept apart, but every student of human nature should work out a harmonious synthesis of the conclusions derived from both approaches.

We say: a harmonious synthesis. A mere juxtaposition is not sufficient. There is too much unity and a too intimate interaction between man's various functions and some of the most vital problems of psychology derive precisely from this interaction. Human freedom and responsibility cannot be understood by merely putting together that which philosophy tells us about the human will with whatever experimental psychology has to say about the human drives or tendencies. And we get an altogether insufficient idea of human knowledge by merely comparing the metaphysics of human cognition with the scientific data about human intelligence.

Some valuable work has been done in that line. Father Brennan's General Psychology [12] (to mention only one of the latest and most satisfying attempts) uses both philosophical and scientific data to explain human nature, and gives us a fuller

[12] R. E. Brennan, O. P., *General Psychology*, New York, Macmillan, 1937. Outstanding also in this respect has been the contribution of the Catholic University of America, represented especially by Dom. F. V. Moore, O. S. B. and Dr. Rudolf Allers.

picture of it than the more "scientific" volumes of the mere experimentalists.

More work of that kind is needed. And nobody seems better equipped for it than the Scholastic Philosopher, with his solid and coherent views on human nature. The time is no longer when he was rather suspicious or even scornful about any incursion of scientific psychology in what he considered his exclusive field. He has come to appreciate the usefulness of this new approach. He has studied its main contributions and it cannot have escaped his attention that experimental psychology, while solving some questions, has also opened many new problems of interpretation and synthesis whose challenge he cannot ignore.

VII.

The question which we asked at the beginning of this article can now be answered. Sometimes and in certain fields psychology is definitely a positive science. It is the aim of the experimental psychologists to extend these fields and to apply the positive methods to an ever increasing range of psychological problems. These efforts must be encouraged. From the very nature of psychology we can predict that they will succeed in extending indefinitely the experimental domain, but that they will never be able to make it coextensive with the field of psychology. The essential psychological problems are beyond the scope of positive science.

These problems can be treated only by philosophy, and therefore psychology is and always will be a part of philosophy. Philosophical psychology will also try to extend its domain, with the same results: and indefinite progress, yet no prospect of ever being able to cover the whole field of psychological phenomena.

Psychology is finally a cultural science. The many problems which cannot or cannot yet be studied by strictly positive

or philosophical methods, will be investigated by means of a combination of both, yielding what we called a cultural science, or a science in the broader meaning.

VIII.

According to certain psychologists psychology is more than all that. It is also a technique, and even an art, because it aims primarily at an understanding of the single individual, who does not fall under the general categories of science, and who can be approached only through individual skill and personal intuition.

But does this not apply to every science? Does every science, as soon as it is applied in practice, not become a technique and an art? Can we not consider engineering as applied physics, and medicine as applied pathology? And do these branches of applied knowledge not require some personal skill and a certain kind of artistic intuition, which distinguishes the successful practitioner from the mere theoreticist? Hence there seems to be no more reason for calling psychology an art than there is for applying that label to physiology or mathematics.

We cannot however dismiss this problem so easily. The case of psychology is a very special one. When other sciences have laid down the universal characteristics of their objects, we know these objects rather well, even if each single one of them shows individual features not included in the general description. These features are quite accessory, they do not affect the nature of the single object, the distance between the general average and the single case is small.

But in man this distance is considerable. Man is not only an individual, but a person as well. Individuals are identical replicas of the same kind of being, representatives of a given species, differing only in accessory qualities, such as color, size, age, etc. and ultimately through the fact that they do not

occupy the same portion of space at the same moment of time.

Persons, as defined by philosophy, are individuals endowed with a rational nature. Ethics demonstrates that persons are ends in themselves, not mere means in the service of other beings or of the whole universe. Empirically the difference between individuals and persons shows especially in the fact that the latter are conscious of themselves as persons, know and will themselves explicitly as such. This predominance of consciousness entails a corresponding predominance of memory, of that "pure memory" so thoroughly described by Bergson, through which all the past experiences are registered and continue to act, so that each person is, in a certain sense, a living summary of his own past, and therefore absolutely different from any other person. Two sodium crystals may have a different history, but that does not make them really different for a chemist. The biologist is hardly interested in the past experiences of the plant which he studies. In animal psychology past experiences take on more meaning and importance.

But it is only in man that this influence of past life becomes of paramount significance. It is impossible to understand a human person perfectly if nothing is known about his "concrete duration." And for that concrete, living time positive science is blind. It does often use time in its equations, but that time is abstract, impersonal and perfectly uniform.

Psychologists have become more and more aware of the great importance of man's past life upon his present behavior and character. A striking consequence of this fact is that, in some quarters, psychology begins to model itself more and more upon history, and upon the most personal form of history, biography. Scientific explanations are being replaced by biographical interpretations. This is one more of those puzzling peculiarities of psychology: confronted with the arduous task of understanding the human person, it turns away from the strictly positive sci-

ences, and goes for guidance towards the least positive of all branches of knowledge.

And rightly so. History, and especially biography, is primarily interested in unique events and their unique connexions. But each human subject, because he is a person, is a unique event, and his life is a succession of unique connexions. Unfortunately of unique events there can be no science in the strictest sense of that word. There can be attempts at description, explanation and prognosis, but no strict quantification and no universal laws. A good biography is in part a work of art. Science alone cannot understand and explain unique events and experiences, and in that sense it is true that psychology, when it is interested in understanding and explaining the single, living person, has to become an art.

IX.

To summarize: psychology is a positive science, using the methods common to all positive sciences, in order to explain man's conscious life. But psychology can never become entirely a positive science, because such a science can thrive only where matter balances form, whereas in man's superior functions, form is clearly predominant over matter. To be sure, even in these superior functions there is a material substratum, and therefore some scope for scientific explanation. But the main influence is formal, hence the work of explanation must be primarily philosophical. Psychology is not only a positive science, it is also a part of philosophy.

Furthermore, the human being, central object of psychology, is not only an individual, but also a person. As such he is partly the product of his own past, and he cannot be understood without an investigation and interpretation of that past. But the study of personal experiences and of their bearing upon the subject's character requires an intuitive grasp which

is more closely related to artistic creation than to scientific investigation.

Man *in general* can be understood only by a combination of philosophy and science. Hence psychology shall be a combination of both, or will not be a complete psychology. The *Individual* person can be understood perfectly only by a psychologist who joins to his theoretical knowledge some kind of artistic intuition and insight.

Hence psychology which studies the most complex of all material beings, the human person in its conscious life, is also the most complex of all sciences an intimate combination of philosophy, of science, and of art.

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A PUBLIC OPINION AND THOMISTIC PRINCIPLES

The Problem

THE problem of whether a thinking man should allow himself to be influenced by public opinion arises from the excessive control it exercises over the actions of countless people today. Though the extent of that influence is a well-known fact, perhaps not one in ten could reasonably justify his acting at the suggestion of public opinion. The purpose of this article is to show from an analysis of Thomistic thought why and how man could be influenced by public opinion without playing traitor to his reason.

A clarification of the meaning of public opinion is necessary because of the remarkable discrepancy among so-called authorities as to its real meaning. Public opinion I define as the thought of another, in so far as it is known, whether explicitly expressed or not, and in so far as it influences the conduct of others. From an analysis of many examples I find the reasons for the force of public opinion to be chiefly two, a respect for the learning of others and a desire for their esteem. These motives flow from the inadequacy of man to attain happiness by his individual effort, and are reasonable if not carried to the extreme. Because the love of esteem is so universal a phenomenon, public opinion is a very effective means of informal social control. Its influence does not cease here, however, for it looms large in the field of ethics. In deciding the morality of certain actions the opinion of the majority is oftentimes the sole criterion. Although such an opinion can never serve as the constitutive norm of morality, under certain conditions it, as well as the opinion of even one man, can be a safe indication of morality.

Reasons for its apparent Neglect by St. Thomas

While this article is called "A Philosophy of Public Opinion in the Light of Thomistic Principles," I must begin it by declaring that he gives it no specific treatment in his work. Am I by that statement indicting myself of proceeding under false colors? I do not think so. Although I can point to no particular question, Opusculum, or Quodlibitum on the problem of public opinion, I can show from various references what St. Thomas' express stand would have been had he the occasion to propose it.

St. Thomas gives no particular attention to public opinion, as here understood, because there evidently was no need for him to do so. Just as he did not take the pains to prove the existence of the soul because all apparently took it for granted, he was not concerned with the question of public opinion as such because then it did not wield the force it does today. True, his contemporaries were essentially the same as any of their predecessors or descendants and, consequently, must have been influenced by the weight of numbers as a standard of value judgments. Even before his time, Seneca had indicated what trust people put in popular opinion when he declared that "we rely entirely upon the judgments of others. We do not regard as best that which is to be praised and sought after, but that which many seek and praise."[1] And Cicero and Pliny were in opposite camps in regard to the trustworthiness of that opinion. Cicero maintained that the testimony of the multitude was not the most reliable because in every art, endeavor, branch of knowledge, or even in virtue itself the best is most infrequent.[2] Pliny asserted that it is better to believe the people as

[1] Pendemus toti ex alienis judiciis et id optimum nobis videtur quod petitores laudatoresque multos habet, non id, quod laudandum petendumque est. (Nec viam malam ac bonam per se aestimas, sed turba vestigiorum, in quibus nulla sunt redeuntium.) Seneca, *De Ot. Sapient.*, c. XXVII.

[2] Cicero: Non Gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis. In omni

a whole than individuals for the latter can deceive and be deceived, whereas nobody has ever deceived all the people and all the people have never led anybody astray.[3] As for the people of today, I think that the modern man is no different from the early Latin citizen in this respect. Now, the people of the thirteenth century were just as social by nature as they were rational and, consequently, had to rely upon their fellowmen for aid in the attainment of their final end. In this they were no different from the inhabitants of the Roman Empire or from the people of our own day. Therefore, they must have employed a most convenient means of aiding their neighbor, i. e., public approval and disapproval whereby men were urged on to good and restrained from evil. Still, we find in Thomas no specific treatment of our problem. Why?

That question was answered when I said previously that public opinion did not constitute a problem in the thirteenth century, although it must have exerted some influence. Obviously, this answer gives rise to another query, "Why did it not constitute a problem?" The answer to that can perhaps be found in a consideration of the important rôle played by religion in the Middle Ages. True, the people must have put some trust in the popular judgment, but only secondarily. In the first place, there were, I think, more really educated people than there are today and the influence they exerted was one born of their intellectual attainments. If the people believed anything on the authority of others, that authority was more likely the word of such men than the voice of popular opinion. Secondly, since Christianity and Catholicity were practically synonymous, and since almost all of the western world at that time was Catholic, the Church wielded an authority that seems incredible and irrational to the

enim arte, vel studio, vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute *optimum* quidque rarissimum est. *De Finibus*, II, 25.

[3] Melius omnibus quam singulis creditur. Singuli enim decipere et decipi possunt; nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt. Pliny, *XII Panegyrici Latini*, I, c. 62, 29-32.

modern unbeliever. The dictum of Mother Church was evidence enough for the deep faith of most of those people. When the Church spoke, there was no appeal to popular opinion against her teaching, for it was God speaking to them through the Church.

In the thirteenth century, moreover, because religion did play such an integrating rôle in the life of man, the good opinion of his neighbor was not so essential to his happiness as it is today. In this age, when the time and energy of so many are expended almost exclusively on the superficial, much importance is attached to externals, many of which are admittedly pure sham. One evidence of this is the fact that the modern man is more concerned with what his neighbor thinks of him than what God thinks, if he even admits a God. The medieval, however, lived considerably closer to God. If he actually lived his religion, the continued friendship of his Maker was most important to him. In considering the advisability of certain actions, for example, he was likely to ask himself first "How will God look upon my action?" and then, "What will my neighbor think?" Yet, by reason of his nature, he could not live in society and remain aloof to the influence of his neighbor. The only difference, but an important one, between him and his twentieth-century counterpart is that he rightly regarded the good opinion of his fellowman as a secondary motive, while the latter too often makes the applause of others the primary, if not the only motive of any praiseworthy activity.

Public Opinion as an Indication of Truth or Falsity

Although St. Thomas would have been most vehement in his denial that the opinion of another can be the constitutive criterion of truth, he nevertheless maintained that that opinion could serve as an *indication* of truth or falsity, especially when many are in accord on a certain point.[4] The reason for this

[4] Et dicit quod hoc quod omnes prosequuntur, idest, quaerunt delecta-

statement can best be seen from a consideration of man's social nature.

If the strength of St. Thomas' conviction about a certain truth can be measured from the frequency of its appearance in his work, he must have been unshakably convinced of the social nature of man. Statements to that effect and proof thereof can be found in three of the four books of the Summa Theologica, in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, the *Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics*, *De Interpretatione*, in the opusculum, *De Duobus Praeceptis*, and especially in the opusculum, *De Regimine Principum*. The phrase, '*homo autem naturaliter animal sociale est*,' occurs with clocklike regularity in each of these works. The gist of all the argument is that man is naturally a social animal, and, therefore, dependent upon his fellowman, because he is not sufficient unto himself. In his *Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle* St. Thomas tells us precisely in what this insufficiency consists. There he says that man requires the aid of others first of all in regard to the very necessities of life. Thus he is generated and educated by his parents and is further aided by the other members of domestic society. Secondly, the individual is associated by the group of which he is a part in acquiring a perfect sufficiency of this life's goods. In this respect he is a beneficiary of civil society in matters pertaining not only to the body but also to the spirit.[5]

tionem, est quoddam signum quod aliqualiter delectatio sit optimum. *Illud enim in quod omnes vel plures consentiunt non potest esse omnino falsum.* Unde in proverbio dicitur quod non perditur omnino fama, quae apud multos divulgatur. *Et hujus ratio est, quia natura non deficit, neque in omnibus, neque in pluribus,* sed solum in paucioribus. Unde id quod invenitur in omnibus, aut in pluribus, videtur esse *ex inclinatione naturae, quae non inclinat, neque ad malum neque ad falsum.* Aquinas, Thomas, *Commentum in X Libros Ethicorum ad Nicomachum*, VII, 13, medio.

[5] Sciendum est autem quod quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, ut pote qui indiget ad suam vitam multis, quae sibi ipsi solus praeparare non potest; consequens est quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicujus multitudinis, per quam praestetur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum. Quo quidem

If, then, man is naturally a social animal because he cannot provide for himself even the bare necessities of life, it is obvious that he is hardly self-sufficient in the acquisition of knowledge. In fact, according to Thomas, man cannot attain by himself the knowledge of what is necessary for life. After stating that animals by natural instinct "know" what is beneficial or harmful for them, and in general "know" what they need in order to live, St. Thomas goes on to say that it is impossible for only one man to arrive at such a knowledge through the use of his reason. This fundamental knowledge is acquired only in common with other men.[6] If, therefore, man is handicapped in the acquisition of such essential knowledge, how much more dependent is he upon his fellowman for knowledge of a more advanced nature? As was stated above, even in more

auxilio indiget ad duo. Primo quidem ad ea quae sunt vitae necessaria, sine quibus praesens vita transigi non potest; et ad hoc auxiliatur homini domestica multitudo, cujus est pars. Nam quilibet homo a parentibus habet generationem et nutrimentum et disciplinam. Et similiter singuli, qui sunt partes domesticae familiae, se invicem juvant ad necessaria vitae. Alio modo juvatur homo a multitudine, cujus est pars, ad vitae sufficientiam perfectam; scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed et bene vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt ad vitam: et sic homini auxiliatur multitudo civilis cujus ipse est pars, non solum quantum ad corporalia . . . sed etiam quantum ad moralia. *Ibid.*, I, 1.

[6] Naturale autem est homini ut sit animal sociale et politicum, in multitudine vivens, magis etiam quam omnia alia animalia: quod quidem naturalis necessitas declarat. Aliis enim animalibus natura praeparavit cibum, tegumenta pilorum, defensionem. . . . Homo autem institutus est nullo horum sibi a natura praeparato, sed loco omnium data est ei ratio, per quam sibi omnia haec officio manuum posset praeparare. Ad quae praeparanda unus homo non sufficit: nam unus homo per se sufficienter vitam transigere non posset. Amplius, aliis animalibus insita est naturalis industria ad omnia quae sunt eis utilia vel nociva. . . . Homo autem horum quae sunt vitae necessaria, naturalem cognitionem habet solum in communi, quasi eo per rationem valente ex universalibus principiis ad cognitionem singulorum quae necessaria sunt humanae vitae pervenire. Non est autem possible quod unus homo ad omnia hujusmodi per suam rationem pertingat. *Est igitur necessarium homini quod in multitudine vivat, ut unus ab alio adjuvetur*, et diversi diversis inveniendis per rationem occuparentur, unus in medicina, alium in hoc, alius in alio. Aquinas, *De Regimine Principum*, I, 1, initio.

ancient times it was quite impossible for one man to be conversant with all the details of prior civilization. For one thing, he had not the time to acquaint himself with all the minutiae that were a part of his life. Moreover, it is not unlikely that many men were intellectually unable to grasp those details. Consider the advanced state of civilization in St. Thomas' day and comprehend all the complexities besetting life in the twentieth century. You will then realize why man is so dependent upon his neighbor to aid him in attaining happiness. Indeed, as Thomas says, nature supplied man with reason to overcome the deficiencies of his physical ability but it is equally true that all men do not possess the same perfection of reason. Experience readily tells us that in intellectual attainments men range all the way from imbeciles to geniuses. If reason is to be the principal aid of men in providing for their necessities and comforts, some will evidently lead a very drab existence. Consequently, they must rely upon the talents of the more gifted to compensate for their own deficiencies. It would, moreover, be very difficult for even the most brilliant to have an adequate knowledge in every field of learning. That is the reason why we have not only the division of labor but also the division of knowledge.[7] Thus, as a result of natural talent or long training and study some acquire a thorough grasp of a particular science, art or trade, and thereby are qualified to act as guides to others who lack that knowledge. And, to act according to the qualified opinion of such specialists is altogether reasonable. Outside that sphere, however, their opinion holds little weight, and they must look to others for guidance.

[7] Quia enim multa necessaria sunt ad hominis vitam, ad quae homo per se sufficere non posset, necessarium est per diversos diversa fieri, puta ut quidam sunt agricultores; quidam animalium custodes; quidam aedificatores, et sic de allis; et quia vita hominum non solum indiget corporalibus, sed magis spiritualibus, necessarium est etiam ut quidam vacent spiritualibus rebus ad meliorationem aliorum, quos oportet a cura temporalium absolutos esse. *C. G.*, III, 134.

That man can reasonably rely upon the learned opinion of his neighbor also can be shown from an examination of that which distinguishes him from every other animal, viz., his intellect. The intellect of man is essentially ordained to truth; it is the goal of all intellectual activity and in the contemplation of the Supreme Truth is to be found man's ultimate happiness.[8]

Endowed with reason, man by his own endeavors can arrive at some measure of truth, but that measure is only too inadequate for one whose destiny it is to behold God Who is Truth itself. The more of truth, therefore, that man acquires in this life, the closer will he come to satisfying his insatiable desire for Truth. Now, just as he must look to his fellowman for aid in providing for the necessities of life, man arrives at a knowledge of truth through the medium of other men in their writings and sayings.[9] Consequently, to look to others for aid in arriving at truth is quite in harmony with the nature of the human intellect. From this the conclusion follows that under certain conditions we can *reasonably* rely upon the opinion of our fellowman. The foremost of these conditions is that his opinion assist us in the acquisition of truth.

Aside from these conditions, however, can the opinion of two or more be a trustworthy guide in forming decisions? A categoric 'Yes' or 'No' cannot be given and St. Thomas does not do so. He does maintain, though, that the opinion of many is apt to be more correct than the opinion of one. We saw an inkling of this in Thomas' Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle wherein he declared that what is to be found in all or

[8] Quia objectum intellectus est ens vel verum commune. *Summa Theol.*, Ia, q 55, a1. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum. . . . *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 3, a8.

[9] Dicendum quod homo ad cognitionem veritatis pertingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per ea, quae ab alio accipit. . . . Quantum vero ad ea quae accipit ab homine, necessarius est auditus, secundum quod accipit ex voce loquentis; et lectio secundum quod accipit ex eo quod per scripturam est traditum. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 180, a3, ad4.

in many appears to be the result of the inclination of nature which tends neither to evil nor to falsity.[10] In response to the question whether the testimony of two or three witnesses is sufficient, St. Thomas first declares that since demonstrative certitude cannot be had in human acts, probable certitude must suffice. Moreover, since the opinion of many is likely to contain more truth than the opinion of one, the testimony of two or three witnesses is sufficient. What we are here interested in is Thomas' assertion *that the opinion of many can give us probable certitude.* Although infallible certitude from this type of testimony cannot be had because at times it can lead to error, we must not neglect the certitude it imparts.[11]

Public Opinion as a Motive of Conduct

An examination of Thomistic thought has indicated that man not only may but ought to look to his neighbor for help in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must ask, "Has man a right to the good opinion of his neighbor and should that good opinion constitute a legitimate motive of activity?" An analysis of the same thought will reveal that, since man is entitled to the good opinion of his fellowman, it can serve as a legitimate *secondary* motive of his actions. Before that analysis is undertaken, however, a very important distinction must be emphasized. The problem is whether the consideration of another's thoughts can motivate conduct. Theoretically, there exist morally indifferent acts. In reality, every act we perform is either morally good or evil, it either adds to or subtracts from our merit. Every act, therefore, that is motivated by the opinion of another has ethical

[10] Cf. no. 4.

[11] Et ideo sufficit probabilis certitudo, quae ut in pluribus veritatem attingat, et sic in paucioribus a veritate deficiat. Est autem probabile veritatem contineat dictum multorum quam dictum unius. . . . Nec tamen quia non potest in talibus (multitudine testium) infallibilis certitudo haberi, debet neglegi certitudo quae probabiliter haberi potest per duos vel per tres testes. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 71, a 2; ibid ad 1.

importance. In regard to actions that detract from our merit, *i. e.*, sins, we can never be legitimately influenced by what another thinks. The reasons for this statement are two. First, if he were to be so influenced, man would be using a bad means to attain a good end and this is never permitted. Secondly, man must prefer the good of his soul to the welfare of his neighbor.[12] But he would consider the good of his neighbor prior to that of his own soul if he would be led by the opinion of that neighbor to commit sin. On the other hand, in regard to meritorious acts man can be legitimately influenced by what his fellowman thinks. The proof of that statement can be found in St. Thomas both positively and negatively.

A consideration of man's nature reveals precisely why he is called a social or political animal. As has been repeated, man is not self-sufficient unto himself even in providing for the bare necessities of life, but requires the coöperation of his fellowman. Now, man, possessed of an immortal soul, is destined for supernatural happiness, the everlasting contemplation and love of God. It is only natural then, that, since man seeks happiness, his every act should be ordained to that ultimate end.[13] This end, being infinite, is beyond anything that man can do to attain it, but in virtue of the Redemption of Christ, man by his acts can merit salvation. This merit he acquires by the performance of good and the avoidance of evil. Man, however, is in the state of redeemed nature, which means that, although he is now capable of attaining salvation, the effects of original sin still remain to plague him. Quite susceptible to the temptations of the world, the flesh and the devil, he must overcome them if he wishes eternal happiness. In this all-important task he must

[12] Dicendum quod in homine duo sunt; siilicet; natura spiritualis et natur corporalis. Per hoc autem homo dicitur diligere seipsum, quod diligit se secundum naturam spiritualem. . . . Et, secundum hoc, debet homo magis se diligere, post Deum, quam quemcumque alium. *S. T.*, II-II, 26, 4 c.

[13] Dicendum quod necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat propter ultimum finem. *S. T.*, I-II, k, 1 c.

rely heavily upon the assistance of his fellowman. This assistance may take many forms, not the least of which are good example, exhortation to acts of virtue, encouragement in despair, the praise of good and the censure of evil. I will now confine myself to a discussion of the last-named method of manifesting one's social nature in a most desirable manner.

When man praises the good and censures the evil he sees in another, he is acting according to the dictates of his reason. It tells him that every good is but a participation of the highest good and is, therefore, deserving of esteem.[14] That same reason also causes him to realize that such praise or censure cannot be the primary motive of his activity. He must not seek the esteem, but the *good* that is esteemed. Man, then, can reasonably bestow praise for good deeds to encourage others in the progress of virtue and to console them in tribulations.[15] Conversely, he can censure evil because it is an absence of due good. One need only recall from experience the stigma placed upon public disapproval to realize how such a censure serves as a restraint upon those who would commit sin. It is in this manner especially that the social nature of men is evidenced, viz., by their mutual coöperation in the pursuit of happiness.

Another proof of the statement that man is entitled to the good opinion of his neighbor and that he can reasonably use this good opinion as a secondary motive of conduct is to be found in the consideration of the virtue of charity. From an examination thereof it can be shown that man is bound to have a good opinion of his neighbor when such favorable opinion is merited. Love implies that the lover think well of his beloved.

[14] A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter . . . *S. T.*, I[a], q. 6, a 4.

[15] Si enim aliquis aliquem velit delectare laudando ut ex hoc eum consoletur ne in tribulationibus deficiat, vel etiam in bono proficere studeat, aliis debitis circumstantiis observatis, pertinebit hoc ad praedictam virtutem amicitiae. . . . Similiter etiam velle placere hominibus propter caritatem nutriendam, ut in ea homo spiritualiter possit, laudabile est. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 115, a 1, ad 1.

Christ introduced no startling doctrine when he declared that we should love our neighbor as ourselves. But they were shocked when He defined who our neighbor is, for under that term He included even their most implacable enemies. According to St. Thomas, however, that commandment was not strictly necessary because the Jews could have known both from previous revelation and from reason the extension of the term, neighbor. On the one hand, it was implicitly contained in the commandment of the love of God;[16] on the other, reason dictates that man love *every one* of his fellowmen.[17] In St. Thomas' declaration that the commandment to love our neighbor is implicit in the first commandment, we find a suggestion of the reason why we must love our neighbor. He maintains that we must love others because they are our 'neighbors' according to the natural image of God and the capacity for glory in them which they share with us.[18] This was but a reiteration of a previous statement that the reason for loving our neighbor is to be found in the fact that he shares the same good with us,[19] and that we all have one ultimate end to which we are divinely ordained.[20] When we love our neighbor, therefore, we are not

[16] Dilectio autem Dei finis est, ad quem dilectio proximi ordinatur. Et ideo non solum oportet dari praeceptum de dilectione Dei, sed et de dilectione proximi, propter minus capaces qui non de facili considerent unum horum praeceptorum sub alio contineri. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 44, a 2.

[17] Lex divina profertur homini in auxilium legis naturalis. Est autem omnibus hominibus naturale ut se invicem diligant; cujus signum est quod, quodam naturali instinctu, homo cuilibet homini etiam ignoto subvenit in necessitate . . . C. G., III, 117.

[18] Ratio quidem diligendi tangitur ex eo quod 'proximus' nominatur; propter hoc enim ex caritate diligere debemus alios quia sunt nobis proximi et secundum naturalem Dei imaginem et secundum capacitatem gloriae. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 44, a. 7.

[19] Proximus autem diligitur secundum rationem societatis in ipso bono. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 26, a 24.

[20] Oportet enim unionem esse effectus inter eos quibus est unus finis communis. Communicant autem homines in uno ultimor fine beatitudinis, ad quem divinitus ordinantur. Oportet igitur quod uniantur homines ad invicem mutua dilectione. *C. G.*, III, 117.

loving him because of himself but because of God, Who is the Highest Good.[21]

The command to love our neighbor implies many corresponding obligations of which some pertain directly to the question of the validity of popular opinion as a motive of conduct. One of these implied obligations is that, since that love would be incomplete without a good opinion of our neighbor, we must think well of him. If we really love our fellowman and if he is deserving of that love, we must form a favorable judgment of him when evidence and justice demand it. Rational beings that we are, we naturally arrive at some decision concerning the world about us and we quickly form some estimation of our fellowman who constitutes such an integral part of that world. Briefly, just as we must love our neighbor because he is the image of God and shares with us the same ultimate destiny, we are bound by the virtue of charity to think well of him as long as he gives us no positive occasion to think otherwise. This good opinion, then, can form a legitimate secondary motive of activity. Under the assumption that we are reasonable and will, therefore, praise the good and censure the evil because we recognize in the one a participation of and in the other a negation of the Highest Good, man can employ this knowledge as an inducement to praiseworthy activity. For the same reason he will think well of others as being a participation of that Highest Good. Furthermore, knowing that in doing good and avoiding evil he himself will participate still more in that Good and, consequently, deserve more the good opinion of others, he can employ the prospect of acquiring or enhancing that good opinion as a secondary motive of his acts. He will also realize that to make it the primary motive is contrary to reason, for

[21] . . . hic non adhaeret amore homini propter seipsum, sed refert ulterius ad finem ultimum, scilicet Deum, Qui est summum bonum. *De Dilectione Dei et Proximi*, c. 4.; De caritate duo praecepta sufficiunt . . . aliud autem quo inducimur ad diligendum *proximum* propter Deum sicut propter finem. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 44, a 3.

then he would be loving an accident of goodness more than goodness itself.

Closely allied to the good opinion a man is entitled to is his right and obligation to acquire fame. If this is so, assuredly he can consider the acquisition of fame a partial motive of conduct. Although many value their good name above all else, sacrificing even higher goods to its acquisition or retention and thus acting sinfully, we do have the duty and right to acquire a good name. Of all the worldly goods that man possesses it is the most precious, though most intangible, because of its proximity to spiritual goods.[22] Once acquired, it is his personal property and whoever unlawfully deprives him of it commits the sin of injustice and is bound to restitution.[23] The motive in acquiring a good name must not, however, be selfish. On the contrary, St. Thomas declares that man must seek fame not for his own sake but for the edification of his neighbor. This latter motive springs from the virtue of charity, while the purely selfish motive classes him among the seekers of inane glory.[24] For the same purpose, moreover, man has the obligation to avoid the stigma of a bad name.[25] Now, the most obvious method of acquiring either a good or a bad name is that of deeds. The aphorism "Actions

[22] Inter quae (bona exteriora) fama praeeminet divitiis, eo quod propinquior est spiritualibus bonis, unde dicitur Prov. XXII: "Melius est nomen bonum quam divitiae multae." *S. T.*, II-II, c. q. 73, a 3.

[23] Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquis potest alicui famam tripliciter auferre. Uno modo, verum dicendo et iuste. . . . Alio modo, falsum dicendo et iniuste. Et tunc tenetur restituere famem confitendo se falsum dixisse. Textio modo, verum dicendo sed iniuste. puta cum aliquis prodit crimen alterius contra ordinem debitum. Et tunc tenetur ad restitutionem famae quantum potest . . . *S. T.*, II-II, 62, 2, ad 2.

[24] Fama enim non est necessaria homini propter se ipsum, sed propter proximum aedificandum. Appetere ergo famam propter proximum caritatis est; appetere vero propter se ipsum, ad inanem gloriam pertinet. *Quodlibitum* X, 13.

[25] Ubi sciendum est quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, homo non debet ex se dare causam infamiae suae sed potius debet procurare bonam famam, juxta illud Eccli., XLI, 15; Curam habe debono nomine. Aquinas, Thomas, *Commentum in Epistolas Sancti Pauli ad Corinthios*, II, 6, 2, medio.

speak louder than words," indicates that men are judged more by what they do than by what they say. If, then, man must seek a good reputation and avoid an evil one; if this end is attained chiefly by his actions, then it must be admitted that public opinion, as here understood, can constitute a legitimate secondary motive of his conduct. In fact, St. Thomas attaches special importance to one's good name as such a motive when he says that to deprive anyone of his good name is a serious offense, because not only does one's good name seem to be the most precious of temporal possessions, but also by the lack of it man is prevented from doing much good.[26]

Still another proof that man can be reasonably influenced by public opinion is found in the obligation he has to make his good deeds known for the glory of God and the edification of his neighbor.[27] The edification of his neighbor must, of course, yield precedence to the glory of God but it does constitute a valid purpose for man to act virtuously in the presence of his neighbor. Moreover, with the same ends in view he can laudably seek his own glory. Why he can do so is best seen from the words of St. Matthew which St. Thomas quotes to support his contention: "Even so let your light shine before men in order that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father in heaven."[28]

Since we are here concerned with the problem whether man can regard the opinion of his neighbor as a motive of action, the statement of St. Thomas that he can laudably seek his own

[26] Auferre autem alicui famam valde grave est, quia inter res temporales videtur fama esse pretiosior per cujus defectum impeditur homo a multis bene agendis. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 73, a 2.

[27] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dominus ibi mandat quod bona nostra faciamus aliis innotescere propter gloriam Dei. . . . Ad secundum dicendum quod Apostolus mandat ut bona coram hominibus provideamus propter eorum utilitatem. Aquinas, Thomas, *De Malo*, 9, 1, ad 1 & ad 2.

[28] Et similiter etiam homo laudabiliter potest ad aliorum utilitatem gloriam suam appetere, secundum illud Matth. V, 16: Videant opera vestra bona, et glorificant Patrem vestrum qui in caelis est. II-II, q. 132, a 1, ad 1.

glory for the edification of his neighbor is of particular interest. In this context glory can be understood to mean renown or good name.[29]

Any act, therefore, which springs partly from a praiseworthy desire to seek glory in the eyes of others is not to be condemned as exhibiting signs of pride or selfishness. Thus, if one knows that by performing an act of charity in the presence of his neighbor the latter will be edified and inclined to follow his example, he can use that knowledge as a partial motive even of an act of virtue. The consideration of what another thinks can, for example, reasonably furnish an additional motive for making a reverent instead of a hasty genuflection, for saying a kind rather than a cross word to another, for refraining from abusive language, for keeping one's temper in check. In objection to this conclusion some may bring up the action of Christ Who condemned the hypocrites for fasting and bestowing alms to receive the praise of men and Who counselled us not to let the left know what the right hand is doing. That objection has no force here, however, because the hypocrites were censured for making the praise of men the *only* motive of their deeds. Our conclusion, on the contrary, emphasizes that such praise is but a *secondary inducement* to virtuous acts.

Another reason for weighing the reaction of one's neighbor before acting can be found in a consideration of honor. Our conclusion is that man can reasonably perform an act which will result in his honor and refrain from what will bring about his dishonor. He can do so because he may laudably strive after honor. As has been stated, everything good is deserving of praise as being a participation in the Highest Good. Now, when a man is honored, he receives public testimony of the good that is in him or that he has performed. He is rendered illustrious in the eyes of others.[30] That man is praised on account of his

[29] . . . et ideo gloria importat quamdam manifestationem alicujus in bono. *De Malo*, 9, 1.

[30] Dicendum quod honor testificationem quandam importat de excellentia

excellence does not imply, however, that honor, which is due God alone is thereby taken away from Him and given to creatures. On the contrary, any praise of man's goodness only redounds to the glory of God. Such is the constitution of our nature that we rise to the higher by means of the lower. Possessing no innate knowledge of God, we must arrive at the knowledge of His existence and attributes through His creatures.[31] Consequently, when we honor man for his virtue, we are indirectly and ultimately praising the goodness of God which is the source of created goodness. In considering the advisability of any action, therefore, man can legitimately ask himself whether his fellowman will bestow honor or dishonor upon him as a result of that act.

In this positive manner one can see why public opinion can serve as a valid secondary motive of conduct. The basic proof is found in the social note of man's nature whereby men are bound to aid each other in the attainment of their common destiny. From this obligation arises the twofold duty of man not only to edify his neighbor but also to refrain from anything that would disedify him. He must, therefore, regard the fulfilment of that obligation as a proximate end of morally good acts. That man has this obligation may also be shown negatively, i. e., by indicating how grievous are the offences against one's neighbor. Since every one is entitled to his good name, a link may be made between these positive and negative methods of argument by a reiteration of the value of a good name and a consideration of some of the offenses against it.

In the coinage of this world, the cash value of a good name is enormous. Not infrequently, it is treasured over and above every other possession. Deprive a man of every external good, but leave him his good name and you will have left him with

alicujus. . . . Ex hoc enim quod aliquis honoratur vel laudatur, redditur clarus in oculis eorum. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 103, a 1; q. 145, a 2, ad 2.

[31] Et sic ex effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse. . . . *S. T.*, I[a], q. 2, a 2, ad 2.

riches. So great, indeed, is the value attached to one's reputation that often we hear of people who have committed, paradoxically, the most heinous crimes to save their good name which has been besmirched in some way. The matter of a reputation is also important if people are to be admitted into select societies or entrusted with responsible tasks. Then, too, since one is known by the company he keeps, he tries to surround himself with friends of spotless reputation. In regard to this, let me cite the reason given by Thomas for condemning backbiting. Backbiting is wrong because it deprives a man of his good name which he requires in order to be fitted for friendship.[32] A good name is of the utmost importance also in the field of business. Credit, without which businesses could not prosper, is usually accorded on the basis of honesty and trustworthiness, i. e., good name. "A good name is a product's most valued virtue" was the theme of an advertisement which appeared in a recent issue of a national weekly. The establishment of that value, expressed in monetary terms, is the concern of every business that is conducted for profit. These few examples, then, serve to indicate the temporal value attached to one's good name. But the specter of selfishness looms large behind this kind of price. What most people entirely overlook is the eternal worth of a good name. That value can best be measured by the price one must pay for depriving another of his reputation.

To blacken the good name of another is to commit the sin of detraction, for detraction by its very nature is ordained to besmirching one's reputation. And that, according to St. Thomas, is a serious sin, a mortal sin, no less. The reason, as we have already seen, is that one's good name is the most precious of all external possessions, the absence of which hinders man from doing good. To show the value attached to a good name, St. Thomas cites the admonition of Ecclesiasticus: "Take

[32] ". . . quia et optima fama, quae per detractionem tollitur, ad hoc maxime necessaria est, ut homo idoneus ad amicitiam habeatur. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 74, a 2.

care of a good name: for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great."[33] In fact, so important is one's good name that man must be given the benefit of it in all doubtful circumstances.[34] This is tantamount to saying that when a man's wickedness is not evident we must regard him as good.[35]

One is guilty of detraction, therefore, not only by impugning false motives to another's activity but also by denying falsely that he is good.[36] Another reason why detraction is so evil is that through it man evidences hatred for his neighbor. In so doing, he increases the distance between himself and knowledge of the truth, for reason dictates that man love his neighbor as being the image of God.[37] If, by detraction he takes away the good name of his neighbor, he is bound in justice to restore it as well as he can.[38] Since the seriousness of the offences against it only emphasizes the importance attached to one's

[33] Detractio autem, secundum suam rationem, ordinatur ad denigrandam famam alicuius. Unde ille, per se loquendo, detrahit qui ad hoc de aliquo obloquitur, eo absente, ut eius famam denigret. Auferre autem alicui famam valde grave est: quia, inter res temporales, videtur fama esse pretiosior, per cuius defectum impeditur homo a multis bene agendis. Propter quod dicitur Eccli., XLI (15): Curam habe de bono nomine; hoc enim magis permanebit tibi quam mille thesauri pretiosi et magni. Et ideo detractio, per se loquendo, est peccatum mortale. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 73, a 2.

[34] Si malum culpae proximi non cogitat, sequitur quod non judicat de malo dubio vel occulto, non despicit de praeterito certo, non damnat de praesenti, non praesumit temere de futuro. . . . *De Dilectione Dei et Proximi*, IX, ad finem.

[35] Et ideo ubi non apparent manifesta indicia de malitia alicuius, debemus eum ut bonum habere, in meliorem partem interpretando quod dubium est. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 60, a 4.

[36] Perversum autem (judicium), quando falsum judicium profert: et quamvis non sit judicandum circa personas, puta ut aliquis judicet malum hominem qui bonus est. *Comm. in ICor.*, 4, 1.

[37] . . . inde est quod ille qui detrahit, incipit magis amare et credere quod dicit, et per consequens proximum magis odire, et sic magis recedere a cognitione veritatis. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 73, a 3, ad 4.

[38] *Cf.* n. 23.

good name, the retention or acquisition of a favorable reputation can partially justify man's actions.

Associated with the idea of reputation is the bestowal of honor as a testimony of goodness. In like manner, the sin against honor is related to detraction. In the latter instance, the reputation of a person is blackened by speaking, as it were, 'behind his back.' By contumely, the honor of a person is taken away in his presence and with his knowledge.[39] Moreover, like detraction contumely also is a mortal sin.[40]

Thus, it is evident from this consideration of the penalties attached to sins against them how important are the possession and preservation of good name and honor. Since, then, these are desirable goods, and since man has the obligation to acquire them, the consideration of whether any decision he makes will increase or diminish his honor and reputation must be accorded its proper rôle as a secondary motive of conduct. But, according to our definition, man thereby come under the influence of public opinion. The only conclusion that can be drawn, therefore, is that man can reasonably be influenced by public opinion as a partial motive of activity.

The discussion of the extent of the force of public opinion involves the widespread phenomenon called irradiation of authority. It would be interesting to discover St. Thomas' judgment of that unreasoning attitude. That judgment, I think, is implicit in his treatment of the evil known as respect of persons. According to our definition, the *person* of another is one of the influences comprising public opinion. The control it exercises upon others was never so potent as it is today. One could cite examples of that influence whereby movie stars,

[39] . . . ita etiam verbo aliquis dupliciter aliquem laedit. Uno modo in manifesto; et hoc fit per contumeliam. . . . Alio modo occulte; et hoc fit per detractionem. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 73, a 1.

[40] . . . si intentio proferentis ad hoc feratur ut, per verba quae profert, honorem alterius auferat, hoc proprie et per se est dicere convicium vel contumeliam. Et hoc est peccatum mortale. . . . *S. T.*, II-II, q. 72, a 2.

baseball players, noted scientists and others of like fame are accorded a prestige and authority they do not merit merely because they shine in the public limelight. Those who give them that prestige and authority are guilty of what St. Thomas would term 'respect of persons.' Discussing respect of persons, St. Thomas declares that it is a sin because "opposed to distributive justice in that it fails to observe due proportion."[41] They who show undue respect for persons are guilty of an imperfection of the intellect. That imperfection consists in failing to observe the due order between things for they allot to others a perfection they do not possess. St. Thomas says that whenever we attribute anything to another we do so either for some cause that makes him worthy of the attribution or out of respect for his person. The first reason is valid. The second is not. Thus, when I believe that electronics will cause remarkable changes in postwar living because reputable scientists have promised them, I am acting reasonably. But I am not acting according to reason when I deny the existence of God on the word of an eminent mathematician. Briefly, then, to succumb to the irradiation of authority is to act unreasonably since it respects only the person of another and not a pertinent perfection that would make him worthy of that respect.

Returning to the main line of thought after this slight digression, we find another proof of the obligation man has to consider the opinion of his neighbor in an analysis of the sin of scandal. As we have seen, man is to a certain degree responsible for the spiritual welfare of his neighbor and will undoubtedly be held accountable for his failure to contribute to that welfare. He can be remiss in his obligation positively by causing scandal in another. In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual

[41] Sic ergo patet quod personarum acceptio opponitur iustitiae distributivae in hoc quod praeter proportionem agitur. Nihil autem opponitur virtuti nisi peccatum. Unde consequens est quod personarum acceptio sit peccatum. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 63, a 1.

downfall by another's word or deed, in so far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.[42] Employing the principle that he is responsible to some degree for his neighbor's salvation, man must thus reason to himself: "If I am sure that by doing this or omitting that I shall *really* scandalize my neighbor, I am bound in conscience to use that eventuality as a motive for positing or omitting an act." In this sense, he must again be influenced by public opinion in forming his decision. Lest anyone, however, falsely conclude that the possibility of scandalizing his neighbor is always to be the determining factor in any decision, I here quote St. Thomas to give the conditions when man can act regardless of the effect of that action upon his neighbor. St. Thomas first declares that words or deeds *per se* can cause scandal whether the intention of the agent be evil or not. Man is bound to avoid giving this type of scandal not only because he may never commit sin but also because, if he did so, he would incur the additional responsibility for leading his neighbor to spiritual ruin. By accident, however, words and deeds can be the cause of another's sin irrespective of their nature and of the agent's intention.[43] This is called passive scandal in distinction to the first mentioned type which is termed active scandal. When there is the danger

[42] Et similiter, in processu viae spiritualis, contingit aliquem disponi ad ruinam spiritualem, per dictum vel factum alterius: inquantum scilicet aliquis sua admonitione vel inductione aut exemplo alterum trahit ad peccandum. Et hoc proprie dicitur scandalum. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 63, a 1.

[43] Dicendum quod dictum vel factum alterius potest esse dupliciter alteri causa peccandi: uno modo per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem, quando aliquis suo malo verbo vel facto intendit alium ad peccandum inducere; vel etiam si ipse hoc non intendat, et ipsum factum est tale quod de sui ratione habet quod sit inductivum ad peccandum. . . . Per accidens autem aliquod verbum vel factum unius est alteri causa peccandi quando etiam praeter intentionem operantis et praeter conditionem operis, aliquis male dispositus ex hujusmodi opere inducitur ad peccandum; puta cum aliquis invidet bonis aliorum. Et tunc ille qui facit hujusmodi actum rectum non dat occasionem quantum in se est, sed alius assumit occasionem. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 43, a 1, ad 4.

of giving passive scandal, is a man bound to respect the opinion of his neighbor? St. Thomas answers this question with a distinction. On the one hand, he says, man cannot omit any act necessary for his salvation in order to avoid giving scandal. The reason is that man must love his own spiritual welfare more than that of his neighbor.[44] On the other hand, in regard to those goods which are not necessary for salvation another distinction must be made. When the person concerned is apt to be scandalized through his own maliciousness (Pharisaical scandal), man must treat the prospect of such scandal with contempt and disregard entirely the reaction of that person who is so evilly disposed. However, when the person in question is likely to be scandalized through his own weakness or ignorance, "spiritual goods ought to be either concealed, or sometimes even deferred."[45] St. Thomas expresses this same thought somewhat differently in two other places. In the one, he says that love of neighbor restrains one even from what is licit lest he scandalize his neighbor.[46] In the other, he declares that, since we must abstain even from what is necessary for

[44] Nam quaedam horum sunt de necessitate salutis; quae praetermitti non possunt sine peccato mortali. Manifestum est autem quod nullus debet mortaliter peccare, ut alterius peccatum impediat: quia, secundum ordinem caritatis, plus debet homo suam salutem spiritualem diligere, quam alterius. Et ideo ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis praetermitti non debent propter scandalum vitandum. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 43, a 7.

[45] In his autem spiritualibus bonis quae non sunt de necessitate salutis, videtur distinguendum.—Quia scandalum quod ex eis oritur, quandoque ex malitia procedit: cum scilicet aliqui volunt impedire huiusmodi spiritualia bona, scandala concitando. Et hoc est scandalum Pharisaeorum, qui de doctrina Domini scandalizabantur. Quod esse contemnendum Dominus docet, Matth., XV (14).—Quandoque vero scandalum procedit ex infirmitate vel ignorantia. Et huiusmodi est scandalum pusillorum. Propter quod sunt spiritualia bona vel occultanda, vel etiam interdum differenda, ubi periculum non imminet, quousque, reddita ratione, huiusmodi scandalum cesset. *S. T.*, II-II, q. 43, a 7.

[46] . . . et secundum hoc, quandoque unctione docente, a licitis quibusdam quasi ab illicitis cohibet, ne proximum quem diligit scandalizet. I Corinth, VIII: Si esca scandalizet fratrem meum et. *De Dilectione*, c. IX, ad finem.

life to avoid scandalizing our neighbor, much more ought we to sacrifice the superfluous.[47] The pertinent conclusions from this consideration of scandal can be thus briefly summarized. In reference to the giving or avoiding of scandal the opinion of his neighbor can affect man in various ways. First, he may not act at all when it is a question of active scandal because of the twofold sin involved. Secondly, when there is the possibility of giving passive scandal, he must consider the person who is likely to be scandalized. If the person concerned would be scandalized through his own maliciousness (Pharisaical scandal), man must completely disregard his opinion. But, should another's weakness or ignorance lead him to scandal, then man must abstain even from those spiritual goods which are not necessary for his salvation.

What is the conclusion to be derived from these positive and negative approaches to our problem? That conclusion can be concisely summarized in the following sentence. An analysis of Thomistic thought has revealed that under certain conditions man can reasonably rely upon public opinion (as here understood), as a standard of value judgments and a secondary motive of conduct. At this point, however, it would be well to gather the threads of the argument into a concluding chapter that we may see more clearly how this conclusion was arrived at.

We have seen that, although St. Thomas nowhere treated our problem specifically, an examination of his philosophy reveals that under certain conditions man can reasonably be influenced by public opinion, whereas in other circumstances he must disregard it altogether. Because he cannot provide for himself even the bare necessities of life, not to mention what he needs to attain happiness, man can and must rely upon his neighbor for aid. Since knowledge is essential to his happiness, man can reasonably look to his neighbor for help in arriving at

[47] Si ergo propter scandalum fratrum abstinendum est quasi a necessariis vitae, multo magis a superfluis. *Comm. in I Corinth*, VII, c. 2, initio.

the truth to which his intellect is ordained. The opinion of the many indeed is more likely to be correct than that of the individual in some instances, but man must not thereby be deluded into accepting this as a general, infallible rule. Knowledge alone is not sufficient for happiness. Man must merit that happiness by the performance of good and the avoidance of evil. In this task he is assisted by others who praise his good deeds and censure his wickedness. Since his happiness is to a certain extent dependent upon the encouragement of his neighbor, man can reasonably use that encouragement as a secondary motive of conduct. Furthermore, by the fact that he is the image of God and shares an ultimate destiny in common with other men he is entitled to the good opinion of others. That good opinion also can partially motivate his activity. Then, too, a man's good name can be another secondary motive of conduct because he has the right and obligation to acquire a good name for the edification of his neighbor whom both God and reason decree that he love. The importance attached to one's good name and honor is evident from the gravity of offenses committed against them. The retention or acquisition of fame and honor, therefore, constitute another valid reason for acting. That man can be influenced by another is also evident from the obligation he has to avoid giving what is called scandal of the innocents. But, by definition, if a man is motivated by these considerations, he is influenced by public opinion. And *reasonably* so. This seems to be the answer to the question whether St. Thomas would admit that man can rationally respect the influence of public opinion.

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GEORGE SANTAYANA

A renewed interest in George Santayana has been marked since the appearance, a year ago, of his autobiography.[1] This small volume, the first in a series, tells the story of Santayana's youth and early manhood. It exhibits the same charm and flowing style which is peculiar to the author who writes with a facile pen, clothing the commonplace and ordinary in raiment of beauty and loveliness. It is his characteristic style that has won for Santayana a prominent place in the field of letters.

Within the covers of this little book we learn what we might have gleaned already from his earlier works, that Santayana is a man apart from his age and environment. He is a solitary soul, a misfit in the troubled and turbulent world in which he lives, and he has been such since his advent into it, over eighty years ago.

George Santayana, poet, playwright, philosopher and novelist, was born in Madrid, Spain, on December 16, 1863 to parents who married when both were well past their youth. His mother, the daughter of José Borras of Reus in Catalonia had previously been married to an American merchant in the Philippines, one George Sturgis of Boston. His father, Augustin Santayana, was an intelligent Spanish gentleman who had traveled much and was cultured and accomplished. Like his wife, he too had lived for a time in Manila. It was while the widowed Mrs. Sturgis was visiting in Spain that she met again and renewed her friendship with George's father. He prevailed upon her to marry him although he was well aware of her intention to bring her three Sturgis children to America where they might claim their rightful heritage and take up again old family friendships.

[1] *Persons and Places*: The Background of My Life, By George Santayana. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944.

Indeed, Mrs. Sturgis had promised her husband before he died that she would do this very thing. Thus it was that George Santayana, a Spanish child, born of Spanish parents in Madrid, came to be reared and educated in America.

When the Santayana-Sturgis family first separated, George did not accompany his mother and her other children to America, but he remained in Spain with his father. However, when he was nine years old, he was united with his mother, his brother and sisters who lived in the Sturgis home on Beacon Street in the oldest section of Boston. Shortly after his arrival the small boy was sent to school, a kindergarten where he was associated with children several years his junior. They spoke no Spanish and he knew not a word of English but soon picked it up, as he says, "by ear." This was not exactly a happy situation for the sensitive, thoughtful young foreigner to find himself in, and there is little wonder that he took no part in the childish games and pranks of his associates, but withdrew into a world of his own. Here, in the realms of fancy, he enjoyed pleasures which reality denied to him. It is easy enough to understand why, in the course of time, he came to believe that, "the whole real world is ashes in the mouth," [2] and that the works of imagination are the only good. Santayana has persevered in this youthful conclusion and today, a solitary old man, he lives in the convent of the English blue nuns in Rome, taking little or no interest in the tumult of the times. He is content to muse and contemplate, to live, like the very old, in retrospect, "the years that were so disturbed in their day." His self-imposed cloister has earned for him from one of his critics the title, "Philosopher on a pillar." [3] Such a title is unique for a philosopher, but one that is appropriate to Santayana. The true

[2] George Santayana, "A General Confession," *The Philosophy of Santayana*, II, Paul Arthur Schlipp, editor, The Library of Living Philosophers, p. 7.

[3] H. S., "Philosopher on a Pillar," *The Saturday Review of Literature*, XXVII, 26, June 24, 1944, p. 16.

philosopher is a man who is at home in any age, who comes to grips with reality and strives to encompass it and unfold its mysteries, but Santayana, living in the very midst of a world conflict is uninterested and unconcerned with the affairs of the moment. Nevertheless, it is as a philosopher rather than a litterateur that he prefers to be known, and rightly so, for in the course of his long life George Santayana has written many volumes which entitle him to a place in this category. As early as 1895 he caused a stir in the philosophical world when he published *The Sense of Beauty*, a successful attempt to construct a theory of aesthetics on a naturalistic basis. The encomiums heaped upon this work are partly due to the fact that it was the first of its kind published in America. It was a starting point for Santayana, however, and within the next ten years he published *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*,[4] *The Life of Reason*,[5] a five volume work which was shortly followed by *Winds of Doctrine*,[6] several literary works, and then in 1920 an essay which brought him wide acclaim and notice, "Three Proofs of Realism," written for a collaborated work entitled, *Essays in Critical Realism*.[7] It was in this essay that Santayana defined and elaborated upon the term *essence*, which has come to be recognized as the keystone that secures his entire philosophy. An essence is, he says, "a universal of any degree of complexity and definition . . . an object inwardly complete and individual, but without external relations of physical status . . . ."[8]

The burden of the Critical Realists was to solve the knowledge problem and Santayana's contribution to the solution was to interpose an essence as a transitive medium of thought between the idea and the object. Because of the terminology he employed

[4] 1900. [5] 1905-6. [6] 1913.

[7] Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellers, Strong.

[8] Santayana, "Three Proofs of Realism," *Essays in Critical Realism*, note, p. 168.

some were inclined to believe that he had a scheme to lead the unsuspecting American philosophers into the Scholastic camp, but nothing was farther from the truth. Santayana's essence is not, as in scholasticism, an abstraction prescinded from reality; indeed, the only relationship he admits as obtaining between facts and essence is one that is wholly symbolic. Yet he asserts that normally essences can be taken as true signs for the objects intended. They are what is given in intuition, they are evoked by the material event, but not abstracted from it. Santayana objects to the term 'abstracted' because in his theory of knowledge the object symbolized by the given essence is itself posited in animal faith and not given. Although he recognizes ideas to be adequate signals of events, he believes it would be ridiculous to consider them as accurate descriptions of any event.[9] Santayana's essences are passive beings, "anything that might be found, every quality of being," [10] but since they have no metaphysical status they cannot exercise any non-natural control over nature. Quite definitely, theirs is not the function of reducing plurality to unity: yet, they are indispensable terms in the perception of matters of fact; they render transitive knowledge possible, since they are signs for what is sought, "ideal terms at the command of fancy." [11] These essences, passive and inert forms which are infinite in number and neutral in value, are selected by matter to define the flux at any given moment. They have the "texture and ontological status" [12] of the Platonic ideas, but though Santayana confirms Platonic logic by assigning an ideal status to essence, he feels that he escapes the illusion of Platonism by insisting on their non-existence. Again and again he asserts and insists that essences are given in intuition, they do not exist. They do have being,

[9] Santayana, *The Realm of Essence*, p. 35.
[10] Santayana, *Skepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 78.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

however, and the being proper to essence is not real but logical, which being is exhausted by its definition (meaning its distinguishing character).[13]

In the elaboration of the doctrine of essence, Santayana goes to considerable lengths to make clear to us that the essence which he describes is in no respect a quality of the object experienced; it is a symbol, a mental reference to it. He insists vigorously that we have need to curb what he terms the "hypostatizing impulse"[14] which tends to make us regard essence as other than what it really is, a mere symbol. He asserts that to view it in any other light will be to render knowledge impossible and reality an illusion. This attitude, however, presents a major problem, that of reconciling the essence as given in intuition with the object experienced. In characteristic fashion Santayana surmounts the difficulty by ascribing to a leap of spirit from the symbol given to the object experienced. He says,

> Transitiveness in knowledge has two stages or leaps, the leap of intuition, from the state of the living organism to the consciousness of some essence, and the leap of faith and of action from the symbol actually given in sense or thought to some ulterior object.[15]

In the last analysis, then, knowledge in terms of Santayana's doctrine is not the intuition of a fact, it is not intramental or internal to experience; it is nothing more than belief, an act of animal faith, since "perception is faith."[16] He denies the capability of the mind to do more than notice or intend something. The best summary of his theory can be made in his own words.

> Knowledge is true belief grounded in experience, I mean controlled by outer facts. It is not true by accident; it is not shot into the air on

[13] Santayana, *The Realm of Essence*, pp. 18-19.
[14] Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 100.
[15] Santayana, "Three Proofs of Realism," *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 183.
[16] Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 69.

the chance that there may be something it may hit. It arises by a movement of the self sympathetic or responsive to surrounding beings, and at the same time an appropriate correspondence tends to be established between these objects and the beliefs generated under their influence.[17]

This makes clear why, for Santayana, knowledge is described as being "always a salutation and never an embrace."[18] It is not, for him, a knowledge of the substance underlying phenomena, a knowledge of the nature of things, but it is merely a knowledge of its meaning to the one perceiving.

The effects of such a solution to the problem of knowledge are easy to recognize: it would be inimical to science, for all efforts to approach to a real knowledge of objective reality are paralyzed if we are unable to grasp the essence of the object experienced; and truth, as we understand it, the relation of an object to an intellect, would be unattainable. If it is impossible to arrive at no more certain conclusion than an act of animal faith regarding the existence of an object, it would be foolhardy to strive further to attempt to attain the truth of anything since a being is true only in so far as it exists. For Santayana, however, truth is, "that segment of the realm of essence which happens to be illustrated in existence."[19] Evidently the fault lies in Santayana's fundamental assumption, i. e., that essences do not exist but are mere symbols for reality. Taking off from this assumption he could never come to the conclusion that the truth of anything coincided with our knowledge of its essence, for he denies the ability of the mind to achieve such knowledge.

Santayana has attempted to adhere closely to materialistic principles and Platonic ideals, and he has been forced into a position that is untenable. The theory of knowledge that he presents is nebulous rather than illuminating.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181.
[18] Cf. Marten Ten Hoor, *George Santayana's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 2.
[19] Santayana, *The Realm of Truth*, preface viii.

But, though the problem of knowledge was of major concern to the Critical Realists, as such, Santayana's interests are not in the main epistemological. He is a moral philosopher who is interested in the good, the happy life. However, we have already cited his doctrine of essence as the vital principle of his entire system of philosophy, and therefore it must ultimately be considered in relation to the happy life. In the development of this relationship Santayana gives free reign to this imagination and his fluent pen, producing a volume entitled, *The Realm of the Spirit*, published in 1940, the last book in the series, *The Realms of Being*, which presents a complete synthesis of his philosophy.

Because he is a staunch materialist, Santayana's ethics are grounded on assumptions of naturalism. He rejects anything like an absolute standard of morality,[20] asserting instead that, "the standard of value is human." [21] He cites the origin of morals as, "the propulsive energy of animal life in any animal that is endowed with imagination"; [22] thus moral life is but the result of the natural development of matter through various stages of progress, and spirit is "an emanation of natural life." [23] This spirit, "the actual light of consciousness falling upon anything" [24] is, though it emanates from matter, immaterial. Yet, in spite of its spirituality it can only arise from an animal psyche.[25] It is on account of its material origin that

[20] Santayana, "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," *The Philosophy of Santayana*, II, p. 562: "Yes, I stoutly assert relativity: I am a dogmatist there; for I see clearly that an animal cannot exist without a habitat, and that his impulse and perception are soon directed upon it with a remarkable quickness and precision: . . . I also see that this knowledge, if it takes an imaginative or moral form at all, must take a form determined by his specific senses and instincts.

[21] Santayana, *Reason in Religion* III, *The Life of Reason*, pp. 144-5.

[22] Logan Pearsall Smith, *Little Essays Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana*, p. 4.

[23] Santayana, *The Realm of Matter*, p. 138.

[24] Santayana, *The Realm of Matter*, p. 138.

[25] Santayana, *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 43.

spirit becomes aware, through the intuition of essences, of all that comes to enlarge and sustain the organic life beneath it, and every evil which threatens it. However, this is not the end of spirit, to become aware of material strains and stresses, for its outlook, says Santayana, rests in essences. "It thinks ideas and its object is universal knowledge and universal love." [26] He tells us that spirit would willingly free itself from matter if it could, in order that it might soar aloft for the contemplation of sublime essences, but the very wings on which it would rise are material since the images, the essences given in intuition, are symbols for material things. This desire of spirit to soar and to be free is not easy of accomplishment, especially in this busy work-a-day world, for contemplation is a habit which "finds a freer course in solitude than in society, in art than in business, in prayer than in argument." [27] Santayana would seem here to be advocating the detachment and solitary life which he himself practices.

Although the spiritual life is the good, the happy life, men have no obligation, according to Santayana, to practice it. However, for those who might be called to embrace it, "those few whose intellectual thirst can be quenched by impartial truth and the self-annihilating contemplation of all Being" [28] (meaning the realm of essence), it constitutes the supreme good. He tells us that spirituality is stimulated by "beautiful and constant things (like pure essences) more than by things ugly, tedious, crooked or uncertain." [29] This would seem to explain why spirit looks toward the realm of essence for its enjoyment rather than in the direction of the existing flux. However, though mankind in general is not obliged to live by the spirit, nevertheless, "spirituality, or life in the ideal must be regarded

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.
[27] Santayana, *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 33.
[28] Santayana, *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 40.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

as the fundamental and native type of all life . . . ." [30] Santayana indicates that deviation from such a viewpoint ought to be regarded a " disease and incipient dissolution," [31] which statement would, it seems, require further explanation, in view of the fact that he has already stated that the spiritual life is for the few. In any case he leaves little doubt but that the spiritual life constitutes for the intellectual man at least, the sole source of happiness, and in this of course, he is quite right. He enlarges upon his notion of spirituality, stating that an intellectual man cannot be satisfied with a world of " perpetual change, defeat and imperfection," [32] though this does not necessarily mean that the spiritual man would be ill at ease in the world of matter; quite the contrary. What Santayana is straining to say is that the spiritual life can be practiced in all its fullness only when man has detached himself from what the spiritual writers designate as ' the world.' He describes it as follows:

> A man is spiritual when he lives in the presence of the ideal and whether he eats or drinks does so for the sake of a true and ultimate good. He is spiritual when he envisages his goal so frankly that his whole material life becomes a transparent and transitive vehicle, an instrument which scarcely arrests attention but allows the spirit to use it economically and with perfect detachment.[33]

Santayana recognizes a natural relationship between religion and the spiritual life and he cites the former as a potent factor in spirituality,[34] but like his philosophy, his religion is basically naturalistic. It has the same relation to life as poetry. They are the same in essence, he tells us, differing only in the manner in which they are employed. " Poetry is called religion when it

[30] Santayana, *Reason in Religion, The Life of Reason,* III p. 195.
[31] *Loc. cit.*
[32] Santayana, " Society and Solitude," *The Nation and the Athenaeum,* XXXVIII, Feb. 26, 1921, p. 755.
[33] Smith, *op. cit.,* p. 87.
[34] Santayana, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion,* preface v.

intervenes in life, and religion, when it merely supervenes upon life is seen to be nothing but poetry." [35] Believing this to be true, he thinks it would be wise if religious doctrines did not 'pretend' to be dealing with factual matters. He condescends to pardon what he regards as misrepresentation on the part of religion however, stating that if its doctrines were not presented as facts the vast majority of men would have none of them. Santayana regards all religions as fictions, myths fashioned by the creative imagination, and hence they are neither true nor false, but only better or worse. It is in this respect that religion plays an adequate role in man's life as a symbol. Santayana, who always classifies himself as a Catholic (he was baptized), has nothing but bitter disregard for Protestantism. However, he himself practices no religion other than his own naturalistic mysticism.

It is singular and interesting to note that in Santayana's exposition of the spiritual life he treats to some length of pure Being. But, this pure Being is not for an instant to be identified with the Pure Being which is the God of Theism or Pantheism; not at all, it is merely the whole realm of essence. By contemplating essence, spirit is enabled to transcend its environment and to borrow the immutability and eternity which is proper to essence. For spirit, this borrowing of immutability and eternity from essence constitutes its salvation. In describing the liberation of spirit, and its final union with pure Being, Santayana employs many terms which are proper to mystical theology. This serves to enhance his account of the spiritual life by making it appear to be more profound than it actually is.

But Santayana is not content to borrow merely the terms of mysticism. He goes even farther, suggesting an analogy between his ontology and the doctrine of the Trinity. By transposing the doctrine into terms of what he calls " pure ontology "

[35] Santayana, *Reason in Religion, The Life of Reason,* III, p. 212. " Spirituality has never flourished apart from religion except momentarily."

and "moral dialectic," the primordial substance, or matter, is seen to correspond to the Father; the realm of essence with the Son. He says that the procession of the Holy Spirit follows from the fact that "love and pursuit of the Good . . . rise on occasion, when matter and form, by a contingent fusion, have themselves become actual." [36] He attributes the power of bestowing life to the Holy Spirit, asserting,

> . . . The spirit *gives* life in the sense that life would nowhere be morally worthy of the name if spirit were not actual there; but the *source* of spirit lies in the Father and the Son, or in my language in matter organized into the form of a psyche. It is not one instance of spirit that creates another, but nature that rises into spirit at the crest of every wave . . . So that it is in the Holy Ghost that the Father, and Son are first truly vivified and united and adore and glorify one another.[37]

However, once he has drawn the analogy Santayana explains that it should not be pressed, since ". . . the one is dogma, the other a language based not on inspiration but on analysis, and meant only to render articulate the dumb experience of the soul." [38]

It would appear that once Santayana gave freedom to his poetic genius and imagination he was carried away with his own enthusiasm, and one is forced to conclude that though he could have done so, he has made little if any, positive contribution to philosophy. He is seen as a philosopher who is fundamentally a materialist, and one who has a penchant for distinctions which enables him to distinguish between the material and spiritual spheres of nature. It is evident, even from this rather sketchy survey of his philosophy, that Santayana was attempting to build an eclectic system from the tenets of materialism and Platonic idealism, using terms from tradi-

[36] Santayana, *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 294.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 295-6.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 299.

tional scholastic sources and notions borrowed from the Indian philosophers. But his efforts met with little success, for he failed to reconcile principles in his system of thought that are, or appear to be, antagonistic. He produced additional confusion by using terms divorced from their traditional meaning.

Santayana has lived a long life during which he has published volumes which have charmed and bewildered those who have tried to take him seriously. Most of his commentators say little about the profundity of his thought, but dwell instead on his manner of employing language. He had the brilliant example of other eclectics like Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas to spur him on to a splendid accomplishment; but he failed miserably because, as he shamelessly confesses, he had neither the patience nor the desire to treat each point minutely and without "escapade." He says that in writing he is prone to indulge a tendency to "ornament, exaggeration and irony," characteristics which bespeak more of the dilettante than the philosopher. He offers no apologies for his conduct; on the contrary he states quite boldly that if his views are often misunderstood, he himself is to blame,

> . . . because I have clothed them in a rhetoric that, though perfectly spontaneous and inevitable in my own thoughts misleads at first as to their character, and in some readers may induce an assent that afterwards has to be rescinded . . . . I detest disputation and distrust proofs and disproofs. Nor do I expect or desire that everybody should think as I do.[39]

But this does not seem to trouble him at all, for he states,

> It is honor enough to be read and studied, even if only to be combated; and I send my critics back to their respective camps with my blessing, hoping that the world may prove staunch and beautiful to them, pictured in their own terms.[40]

[39] Santayana, "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," *The Philosophy of Santayana*, p. 604.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 605.

Remarks such as these make one wonder at times about Santayana's sincerity as a philosopher, and yet if any philosopher ever attempted to put his principles into practice, that man is George Santayana. For a lifetime he has led a solitary and contemplative existence—but to what end? To revel, it would seem, in the intellectual vision of a pallid, lifeless essence which he calls pure Being. How sad that as the end of the spiritual life he holds up an emaciated, inert essence in substitution for Reality Itself, that Pure Being which is the Beatific Vision. What folly or blindness could have caused a man born with the rich heritage of Christian philosophy to have thrown away the kernel and retained only the shell of his inheritance? The lonely child can be pardoned for making a world from his dreams and fancy, but the grown man must face life squarely and cope with the problems it offers. Perhaps, before his long life comes to an end, George Santayana may be touched by Grace, may give reign to the common sense he has so often lauded, and then, having rid himself of the tyranny of a false and meaningless mysticism, he may see things as they really are. This is something to be hoped and prayed for, because one glimpses in his writings evidence of a nostalgic spirit groping bravely against the thralldom of matter for the Truth.

In spite of itself, human nature cannot escape from its own contingency and, in consequence, its utter dependence upon God. Any system of thought which fails to take cognizance of this fact is doomed from the outset to failure. No matter how loudly the naturalist shouts that material things need no justification for their existence,[41] he does not rid himself of the necessity of explaining them, but makes the need for an explanation even more evident by his insistence. In his philosophy Santayana failed utterly to take cognizance of the First Cause, the Absolute, and on this account he can give no adequate explanation of what

[41] Santayana, *The Realm of Matter*, preface v.

is relative, since effects are understood only in reference to their causes. He makes no effort to reconcile his forthright materialism with the Platonic essences of which he was enamored and, since he would eschew neither one nor the other, his philosophy is a jumbled mixture of irreconcilables that are never made to harmonize. By appending a theory of spirit to his materialism he falls into the usual error of having the greater come from the less. Santayana is so loath to follow truth to its ultimate conclusion that he appears to be more of a dreamer than a philosopher.

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BOOK REVIEWS

An Introduction to Modern Philosophy: In Six Philosophical Problems. By ALBUREY CASTELL, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. Pp. x + 562.

Unlike so many other volumes of the same title, the work is precisely what it purports to be, an introduction to philosophy. The author introduces the reader to modern philosophy by choosing six problems in the field: theological, metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, political, and historical. He then calls upon recognized modern philosophers in each field to elaborate these questions, in so far as feasible, in their own words. Thus in considering the theological problem, Saint Thomas, Pascal, Hume, John Stuart Mill, and James are called upon in turn to present their solution to the problem. Among other noted philosophers cited are, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Hegel. They were chosen because "they provide a varied gallery in which to roam." (P. 93.) The selection of questions is excellent, being those which are basic and of deep significance to philosophy, i. e., the existence of God, the relation between reality and appearance, the distinction between right and wrong.

It is gratifying though strange to find Saint Thomas listed among modern philosophers. The author justifies his inclusion since "he is in many ways the prince among theologians." (P. 12.) He paraphrases St. Thomas' *Quinque Viae* lest his "*ipsissima verba* would get between him and the reader." (P. 5.) Actually, the author himself comes between St. Thomas and the reader, for his interpretation of the arguments for God's existence is very superficial and misleading. He completely misses the subtilty and depth of these arguments and gives no evidence of being familiar with the metaphysical principles underlying these proofs. As stated they have no cogency to convince any mind—much less the 'modern mind 'of God's existence. The argument from the degrees of perfection he interprets as an ontological argument, which argument St. Thomas unequivocally rejected.

The work is an excellent presentation of modern philosophy as a welter of conflicting opinions and contradictions. The one source of agreement among these philosophers seems to be that each considers

his the last word to be said in regard to these problems. Upon a student, hopefully seeking truth, this survey of modern philosophy would have a devastating effect. The author himself notes that it "leaves a sense of bewilderment, not to say chaos." (P. 5.) Characteristically modern in his attitude he advises the reader that "The only guarantee against further chaos and more "alternatives" is an invincible skepticism bred from a knowledge of past and present efforts and failures." (P. 6.)

The citations chosen by the author are well selected to manifest the thought of the philosophers. They are readable and in instances where obscure, comments from the author make them understandable. The work would make profitable collateral reading in a course in modern philosophy.

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The Mystery of Iniquity. By PAUL HANLY FURFEY. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1944. Pp. 192.

In his recent work, The Mystery of Iniquity, Father Paul Hanly Furfey has given a thorough, interesting, and above all, a thought-provoking treatise on the problem of evil in society. Quoting St. Paul's words, "the mystery of iniquity is already at work" (II Thess. II, 7), the author shows how unrealistic it is for us to disregard or even try to minimize the operation of Satan in the world.

As a sociologist who understands his field well, Father Furfey demonstrates the fundamental error of the materialist who would settle all social problems according to purely natural terms. This method is hopeless because it fails to recognize the supernatural end of man and also rejects the doctrine of divine grace as a necessary means to a good life.

Thus the Catholic position on social problems is diametrically opposed to this materialistic view. It considers man's sojourn in the society of his fellowman as something temporary, yet unmistakably leading him on to a higher and eternal life. The sociologist who does not take into consideration the malignant operation of Satan, of the mystery of iniquity, in the world is not attacking the problem at its source, and consequently, the remedy is only superficial.

Father Furfey has given the name "Catholic conformism" to that state of mind and mode of action that tends to water down or completely disregard the supernatural. Not only do they, the "conformists," disregard the supernatural, talking and acting as if man has no other end than this world, no other help than his own natural strength, but they strive to defend their position by arguments that seem to justify their position. The author takes up some of these arguments, or rather excuses, commending what is true in them, but also showing up the false philosophy that is latent in them. Basing his position upon the attitude of Christ Himself towards the society of His own day, and towards the evils therein, Father Furfey brings out forcibly the characteristics of the Christian sociologist who is to be in fact a genuine follower of Christ. He must, like Our Lord Himself, tell the truth about society. He must act upon that truth without compromise. The Catholic today simply must be honest. There is no other way to get at the root of evil in society in order to effect a permanent cure.

To demonstrate his contention of "conformism" chapters are devoted to showing its effects in social work, in the use of money, in the labor problem, in family life, in race relations, and finally, in one's love of country. Each problem is important, modern, developed clearly and logically, and a challenge to the reader. The stirring plea to "come out from among them, be separated" (II Cor. VI, 17) is an exhortation that cannot go unheeded. Whether or not one agrees entirely with the writer in demanding that "we must break sharply and clearly with the modern world" and "stand by ourselves in honorable isolation" it is nevertheless true that unless a Catholic is faithful to his own unique doctrine, completely and in every particular application to the problems of society, he is not fully Catholic. The book is an intelligible and readable presentation of a question as important as it is fundamental. It is excellent food for thought and meditation.

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The Dream of Descartes. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Trans. Mabelle L. Andison. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945. Pp. 220. $3.00.

This volume presents a consistent symposium on aspects of Cartesianism viewed by one mind, a deepening but unchanging mind, over a long period of years. The first three of its five essays, the author tells us in his preface, were published as articles in 1920 and 1922; the fifth was delivered as a lecture at the Franco-Russian Studio in 1931; only the fourth, a recent study, appears here for the first time. What gives unity to the work is its purpose which is "to try to determine the value and significance of the Cartesian reform with regard to metaphysical and theological wisdom."

The first essay which lends the book its title is at once a fascinating account and a penetrating criticism of the inception of Cartesianism, of the "Mid-Autumnal Night's Dream conjured up by a mischievous genius in a philosopher's brain," wherein Descartes' philosophical vocation was made clear to him, the reform of reason was conceived, and the foundations were revealed of that *scientia mirabilis* which disregarding the diversity of the sciences was to embrace all things knowable in a specific unity. Maritain's study, though human and vital, is a carefully documented weighing and balancing of fact and of conjecture; of friendly and of adverse interpretation concerning that historic episode; and he is of the opinion that "it was thus that Descartes perceived, caught up in a single intuition, the vital idea, the *logos spermatikos* of his philosophical reform." The revelatory nature of that inception accounts to Maritain for what he calls the "angelism" of Descartes; for the fact that "Descartes so often seems to conceive Philosophy on the pattern of Theology," science being for him, while a human science, "at the same time divine, by revelation, . . . the very science of God and of the angels."

The second essay, "The Revelation of Science," is an incisive analysis of the ambiguities of the Cartesian mode of thought, and an illuminating if summary indication of the grounds on which such diverse systems as positivism and idealism, ontologism and agnosticism can lay claims of kinship to a common progenitor. Further, it submits to diagnostic scrutiny the Cartesian concept of Science, a science, "all of whose elements are born with our mind, and which is thus only an orderly unfolding of ourselves or our thought," and points out the consequences of this "Myth of Science" for human knowledge.

Foremost among these consequences and in a sense including them all is "The Deposition of Wisdom," and this is the special topic of the third essay. Here Descartes is shown as falsifying the Scholastic concepts of faith and theology through realizing them in a *material* way. A brilliant parallelism is set up between these concepts in St. Thomas and in Descartes, faith, in the latter, being rooted in the will, not the intellect, and so become "static," and theology being separated from philosophy and ultimately destroyed as a science, with debilitating and eventually catastrophic effects upon metaphysics.

Assuming in his readers a knowledge of Descartes' arguments, Maritain attempts in his analysis of "The Cartesian Proofs of God," he says, "only to emphasize their essential logical line, as in a diagram, in order to bring out their presuppositions, and to make their value clear." What he effects in this masterly essay, together with a kind of transillumination of the Cartesian mind at work, is a profound Thomistic exegesis of its theodicy and a refutation of it as anthropomorphic and imaginative. So far as it is applicable, he transposes St. Thomas' criticism of St. Anselm's argument to Descartes' ontological proof; and he shows the fallaciousness of the reasoning by which Kant was later rightly to condemn this proof, and wrongly to reduce St. Thomas' arguments to dependence on it.

The concluding essay "The Cartesian Heritage," designed as a lecture, is tempered in tone and style by its original purpose. Only the last one of the 217 notes at the end of the book appertains to it. There is little in its pages that has not been touched upon or treated more fully in the earlier essays; yet its approach is different, and it adds a note of completeness to the work. "Disjunction and rupture" are found to be "the most deep-seated characteristic of the Cartesian reform," and this disruptive force is studied in the problems of the connection between thought and thing, the hierarchy of the sciences, and the unity of the human composite. The cultural significance of this Cartesian heritage of idealism, rationalism, and dualism is weighed—and found wanting. Richer meaning is given to Maritain's prefatory remark, "All rationalization engenders absurd results when it is not the result of an integral reason which heeds the order of wisdom and of nature."

One can regret with the author that he has not found time to devote a whole comprehensive work to Descartes. Perhaps no one is more conscious than he of the limitations of this little volume. One cannot but be glad, however, that in the absence of opportunity for the

greater accomplishment, he has at least seen fit to make these cogent and perennially valuable studies available in their present form.

SISTER FRANCIS AUGUSTINE RICHEY

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An Introduction to Philosophy. By PAUL J. GLENN, Ph. D., S. T. D. St. Louis, 2, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1944. Pp. viii & 408. $3.00.

In the Preface to his *Introduction to Philosophy*, a textbook for the undergraduate, Doctor Glenn proposes a number of questions which the young collegian naturally expects to be answered in an introductory course of philosophy. The book is an answer to these questions and a discussion of their relation to other problems.

The text is divided into two parts. The first part, which is mainly historical, treats of the origin and growth of philosophy. The second part deals with the perennial questions of philosophy. This twofold division simplifies the work and thus aids both teacher and student. Before discussing the origin and growth of philosophy, Father Glenn introduces the student to the subject, first, by defining philosophy, then, by explaining the definition and, finally, by showing the relation of philosophy to the positive sciences and to Theology. The first chapter, entitled "The Beginnings of Philosophy," is divided into two articles, "The Roots of Philosophy" and "The Emergence of Philosophy." In the former the author proves that the roots of philosophy are in man's nature, primitive revelation, and tradition. The latter is a short summary of the first efforts of man in philosophizing, through which efforts philosophy has emerged. The second Chapter presents the development of philosophy. It is divided into three articles: "Socrates and Plato," "The Philosophy of Aristotle," and "The Course of Philosophy after Aristotle." This second chapter is a succinct history of philosophy from the time of Socrates to the end of the Patristic period. Chapter III is devoted to "The Perfecting of Philosophy"; it "discusses the rounding of philosophy into full and relatively complete form in the Scholastic System." Here the author ably and clearly treats the factors of perfection in philosophy and the achievement of some of the great philosophers of the age of perfection, which is, of cause, the glorious period of Medieval Philosophy. The teachings of Anselm, Abelard, The Arabians, Albert, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham

are treated as adequately as an Introduction to Philosophy demands. Chapter IV, The Course of Philosophy to our Times," is a historical summary of philosophy from the age of transition to the present day.

The second part of the book is focused on what the author calls the " seven essential question " of philosophy. These are: the Logical, the Critical, the Ontological, the Cosmological, the Psychological, the Theological, and the Ethical. One would like to see here an Introduction similar to that the preceding Part I, which would show the interrelation and connection of these various questions. The author allots a chapter to each question, and again, as in Part I, the chapters are divided into articles. In each article the author has investigated the major problems of the question. For example, Chapter IV which deals with the Cosmological Question, discussing the origin, the development, and the finality of the " bodily world," examines the nature, the activity and the constitution of bodies, and in addition the various theories regarding the physical essence of material bodies. The other questions are treated in a similar manner. Approximately two thirds of the book are devoted to the development of " the seven essential questions."

One might question, however, whether or not the amount of subject matter included is too great for one college semester. The competent teacher can, nevertheless, manage by either omitting or summarizing certain problems. *The Introduction to Philosophy* manifests knowledge, wide experience, and labor on the part of Doctor Glenn, who is to be congratulated for his zeal and upon his success. Such a text has long been needed and Doctor Glenn has supplied the need.

SISTER MARY CAMILLA, C. D. P.

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Philosophy—East and West. Edited by CHARLES A. MOORE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. 334. $3.50.

We do not think it an exaggeration to say that in this country survey courses in the History of Philosophy tend to glance only briefly, if at all, at early Oriental Philosophy in order to hurry on to Ionia and the beginnings of philosophy in the West. It is one of the several virtues of this scholarly and intriguing volume that it supplies a partial remedy for this situation. This is not its purpose, however, and the authors have not limited themselves to the ancient systems of the East.

The ten essays in the book (by eight different authors) present the results of the East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1939. The editor is Chairman of the Department of Philosophy in that institution. In his *Preface* he states that "the conference was particularly concerned with the significance of the philosophy of the East for the West" and that its "underlying purpose was to determine the possibility of a world philosophy through a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of East and West, and to reach conclusions in the form of specific suggestions concerning the most fruitful ways in which such a synthesis could be effected."

By and large the authors have remained faithful to this purpose. The title is something of a misnomer, for the philosophies discussed at length are those of the East; the Western systems are brought in only for purposes of comparison. No exponent of Scholasticism is represented, though St. Thomas receives an occasional nod of recognition. Modern Scholastics will not be complimented by noting that "Roman Catholic Neo-scholasticism" is lumped with Protestant Fundamentalism, Barthianism, Buchmanism, "and whatever may come out of the war" as reactions rather than advances on the question as to whether monotheism dominates Western thought.

The conferees rightly felt that they needed to know more about Oriental Philosophy if they were to learn from it. Essays II-VII in this book are valuable surveys and interpretations of the different historical and actual Oriental systems of thought. Dr. George P. Conger writes an "Outline of Indian Philosophy." He is the only Western philosopher writing in this section. Dr. Junjirō Takakusu of Tokyo gives a separate treatment to "Buddhism as a Philosophy of 'Thusness.'" The "Story of Chinese Philosophy" is interestingly told by Dr. Chan Wing-Tsit, who also contributes a comparative study of Eastern systems in "The Spirit of Oriental Philosophy," which is very informative. In his "Interpretation of Zen-Experience" (Zen Buddhism) Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki of Kyoto writes a unique essay which this reviewer found almost unintelligible. Attention is centered on India and China, but Japanese traditions are not neglected, and Dr. Shunzō Sakamaki furnishes a timely treatment of "Shintō-Japanese Ethnocentrism." The philosophies of Babylonia and Assyria, Egypt, or Persia are barely mentioned. Students of St. Thomas will note with interest the analogies between *actus* and *potentia* and the *yin* and *yang* doctrines of the Chinese.

The remaining essays are studies in comparative philosophy. Professor Hocking of Harvard sets the tone of this section in his introductory "Value of the Comparative Study of Philosophy" when he urges acceptance of the third of "three historic attitudes in dealing with what is beyond our own circle of ideas": "This is strange and alien—avoid it; this is strange and alien—investigate it; this appears strange and alien—but it is human; it is therefore kindred to me and potentially my own—learn from it." He himself finds that Oriental Philosophy stresses corporate social life and otherworldliness (or mysticism) versus the individualism and realistic humanism of the West, and asks for a "supplementation" or synthesis of philosophies in this regard. We suggest that St. Thomas made the synthesis long ago.

Dr. Filmer S. C. Northrop studies "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy." This is a comparison in terms of the use of "concepts by intuition" and "concepts by postulation." We are grateful for the painstaking definition of terms throughout this essay, but there is much with which one must disagree. There is for instance, a glaring misinterpretation of the nature of Aristotelian abstraction and universal ideas. As this reviewer understands him, the author says that Aristotle "postulates" the character of necessity in universal ideas. "An Aristotelian 'idea,' like a Whiteheadian 'eternal object,' is a Platonic 'sensible' given an immortal persistence by postulation." (P. 180.) For Aristotle the intellect does not "postulate" universals; it abstracts them.

The concluding summation by the editor, "Comparative Philosophies of Life," applies the material of the preceding chapters. One is struck especially by the insistence on the variety and complexity of Oriental thought. After reading this book one realizes how inadequate are all facile generalizations about Eastern Philosophy. Dr. Moore suggests that the following major phases of Oriental ethical thought, as *emphases*, are in contrast to the major *tendencies* of Western philosophy and Western civilization: "(1) the recognition of the 'practical' aspect of philosophy, (2) the attitude of 'Ultimate Perspective,' (3) the attitude of 'Dual Perspective,' (4) the tendency toward some form of 'Negativism,' (5) Monism or the tendency to see individual man in some larger perspective, and (6) Idealism in some general meaning of that term." He too pleads for a synthesis of East and West into some "world philosophy."

This is a valuable book because it presents valuable information in

concise form. Its purpose—a universally accepted philosophy through synthesis—is laudable, but after reading it one is left with the haunting impression that its authors (especially the Western authors) are building on weak epistemological foundations. They neglect the fact that only a synthesis of objectively true doctrines is admissible. No satisfactory synthesis of philosophy can be effected if it is based on compromise and "mutual concession" in the sense in which these authors use those terms. The criterion for the admission of any doctrine into a world synthesis of philosophy must be its conformity to absolute truth.

There is a very helpful *Who's Who of Contributors* and a detailed index. Typography and format are excellent.

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The Elizabethan World Picture. By E. M. W. TILLYARD, Litt. D. New York: Macmillan, 1944. Pp. vii +108. $1.75.

Of indubitable value to the student of Elizabethan literature and of immediate human and artistic interest to almost any cultivated reader, this trim little volume is nevertheless not, except in the very broadest sense of the term, a philosophical work. What it does is to challenge, with carefully selected and beautifully organized excerpts from writers of the age and pertinent critical literature, the modern assumption that the Elizabethan age was mainly secular, and to show that the Elizabethan world picture was still solidly theocentric, and, in its concept of cosmic order, largely continuous with the medieval period.

Together with a preface, an introduction, and an epilogue, the topics of "Order," "Sin," "The Chain of Being," "The Links in The Chain," "The Corresponding Planes," "The Correspondences," and "The Cosmic Dance" form the framework of this engaging ensemble. The professor of natural theology or of Christian humanism seeking to stimulate the student mind to a grasp of philosophical concepts through concrete imagery may find here eloquent expression of the hierarchy of beings and of man's peculiar position in it. Apart from that possible use, the book is for the philosopher's non-professional moments.

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